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IS AN INVIOLABLE CONSTITUTION A SUICIDE PACT? 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON EXECUTIVE POWER TO 
PROTECT THE SALUS POPULI 
RYAN PATRICK ALFORD* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the thorniest issues ever put to jurists of the western legal tradition 
is the question of the proper scope of executive powers in a time of crisis. It 
has been disputed vigorously during key episodes in history; this has helped to 
define the boundaries of constitutional government against tyranny, absolute 
monarchy, and dictatorships. Despite apparently decisive rejections of 
overbroad executive powers at formative moments of legal history, the issue 
has proven itself perennial; even as threats to the state take on ever more 
frightening proportions, the issue is repeatedly reopened. 
A written constitution can be seen as an attempt on the part of a nation to 
tie itself to the mast of the rule of law, such that no emergency can tempt the 
people to dispense with the principle that they are governed by laws, and not 
by men. However, the idea that the chief executive should have the power to 
dispense with impediments to his effective management of a crisis has proven 
itself a powerful siren song. The traditional rebuttal to those who have insisted 
on inflexible adherence to the written text has been the rhetorical assertion 
attributed to Justice Goldberg, who declared that “while the Constitution 
protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”1 This 
argument fails to note that in the same opinion, in a passage that is less well-
known than Goldberg’s pithy epigram, he also stated: 
The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due 
process under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout our 
constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that 
 
* Assistant Professor, Ave Maria School of Law. Special thanks to my research assistants Jason 
Gardner and Peter Schofield, and to the staff of Ave Maria School of Law Library for their able 
and diligent assistance. Thanks also to the organizers and presenters at the 2012 Southeastern 
Law Scholars Conference and the 11th Circuit Legal Scholars Forums for their valuable feedback 
on an early draft of this Article. 
 1. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
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there is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional 
guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit governmental action.2 
Ever since Polybius, constitutional theorists have grappled with the correct 
balance between adherence to fixed legal principles and the desire for 
flexibility in protecting the public welfare during times of war, rebellion, and 
political crisis. Polybius believed in a cycle of constitutions, in which every 
democracy will inevitably devolve into a dictatorship.3 His work proved 
prescient; history is replete with examples of tyrants who rose to power out of 
the ashes of the constitutional crises that led to broad grants of emergency 
powers, of which Julius Caesar, Oliver Cromwell, and Napoleon Bonaparte are 
only the most prominent examples. However, as Aristotle countered, 
constitutional government has proven surprisingly resilient despite these 
reversals of fortune, coming back in ever-stronger forms after periods of 
tyranny and repression.4 
In recent years, rather than asking the historical question of whether the 
Framers of the Constitution of the United States had a particular intention to 
grant the executive emergency powers to disregard specific constitutional 
protections during a crisis, many American legal theorists have turned instead 
to the philosophical question of whether a constitution must, by necessity, 
contain such a provision. These theorists (among them, John Yoo, Richard 
Posner, and the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist) have pointed to events 
subsequent to the founding to argue that the Framers could not possibly have 
meant to prevent such great presidents as Thomas Jefferson and Abraham 
Lincoln from overstepping the letter of the law. 
These arguments have taken on a new prominence—and a darker 
countenance—in the wake of terrorist attacks on the United States. Certain 
theorists now argue that we must balance our liberties against the very real 
threat of catastrophic shocks to the nation. These assertions require a serious 
and thoughtful response. What light can legal history shed on this issue? One 
must first consider how the issue has been framed: Michael Stokes Paulsen has 
argued that the President has an implied constitutional power to declare an 
emergency after detecting a serious threat to the state, and accordingly he has a 
constitutional power to take any action he deems necessary to deal with this 
situation, up to and including authorizing acts of war and torture.5 
 
 2. Id. at 165. 
 3. See POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES bk. VI, at 287–89 (W.R. Paton trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1954). 
 4. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, at 325–35 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
1977). 
 5. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 
1258, 1280, 1282 (2004). 
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Legal history can be used to prove three relevant points in refutation of 
Paulsen’s assertion. First, the greatest minds of a constitutional tradition that 
stretches across millennia have described this as the idea most dangerous to 
both democracy and constitutionalism itself. Second, no constitutional order 
has ever tolerated such a broad principle of executive privilege, although it has 
been repeatedly advocated by legal theorists in support of absolutism. Third, 
the Framers not only did not include an implicit principle of this type in the 
Constitution of the United States, but also possessed no inclination to do so, 
such that it is absurd to imagine that they would have failed to make their 
departure from millennia of constitutional tradition explicit. 
I.  NECESSITY, THE SALUS POPULI, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
A. The Argument that Safety Demands a Constitutional Doctrine of Necessity 
Paulsen is very frank in his advocacy of the proposition that the President 
has the power to ignore explicit constitutional restraints on his powers 
whenever he believes he must act to protect the public welfare during an 
emergency: 
The Constitution itself embraces an overriding principle of constitutional and 
national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of construction for the 
document’s specific provisions and that may even, in cases of extraordinary 
necessity, trump specific constitutional requirements. . . . 
  . . . In short, the Constitution either creates or recognizes a constitutional 
law of necessity, and appears to charge the President with the primary duty of 
applying it and judging the degree of necessity in the press of circumstances.6 
From the point of view of legal history, this description of the President’s 
powers is simply astonishing. It would invest him not only with authority that 
far exceeds that of George III, but one that exceeds even the absolutist 
impulses of the Stuart monarchs. To find an English king with emergency 
powers this broad, one must reach back across the Middle Ages to a time 
before these kings recognized that the Magna Carta bound them to the rule of 
law, that is, to the reign of Edward II.7 Paulsen explicitly sidesteps the 
argument that the Framers could not have wished to grant the President powers 
that were substantially greater than any English monarch,8 and instead insists 
that this is a necessary feature of any durable constitutional order: “Either a 
constitutional law of necessity exists or it does not. . . . [I]f it does not, the 
Constitution is a suicide pact.”9 
 
 6. Id. at 1257–58. 
 7. See Ryan Patrick Alford, The Rule of Law at the Crossroads: Consequences of Targeted 
Killing of Citizens, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1203, 1204–06. 
 8. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1287–89. 
 9. Id. at 1259. 
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His argument countenances no limits on what the President can do when 
faced with an emergency, which he alone has the power to define.10 Paulsen 
explicitly states that this would make torture not merely morally defensible but 
constitutional.11 Foreshadowing Judge Posner’s arguments,12 Paulsen states 
that “[t]he reasonableness of the intrusion is a function of the circumstances, 
and the magnitude of the imminent danger can justify what otherwise might be 
. . . unreasonable.”13 Accordingly, Paulsen provides a justification for John 
Yoo’s argument that no law or treaty could be passed that could prevent the 
President from crushing the testicles of a terrorist’s child in a vise, should he 
believe that this would save American lives.14 Indeed, Paulsen argues that the 
President is obliged to violate specific provisions of the Constitution in such an 
emergency, and that he should use every possible tool at his disposal: 
The first duty of the President of the United States is to preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution of the United States by preserving, protecting, and 
defending the United States, by every indispensible means within his power. 
. . . [T]he existence of such a constitutional duty of the President very strongly 
implies the existence of legitimate constitutional power on the part of the 
President to carry out that duty.15 
Despite the apparently radical nature of this position—reminiscent of a 
claim that one must sometimes destroy something in order to save it—this 
interpretation of the Constitution has been influential. Oren Gross has provided 
substantial scholarly support for Paulsen’s thesis.16 Gross argues that the rule 
of law is a “Business as Usual model,” which disregards the actual use of 
emergency powers by the executive in times of emergency, which, following 
principles of legal realism, are actually embedded within the constitutional 
order.17 Gross describes the “radical solution” to the problem of terrorism as 
one that acknowledges: 
Legal rules and norms are too inflexible and rigid to accommodate the security 
needs of states. . . . Maxims such as “necessity knows no law,” “salus populi 
suprema lex est,” “inter arma silent leges,” and “raison d’état” reflect this 
 
 10. Id. at 1291. 
 11. Id. at 1280. 
 12. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 14 (2006). 
 13. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1280. 
 14. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 110TH CONG., REINING IN THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF 
GEORGE W. BUSH 113–14, 126 (Comm. Print 2009). 
 15. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1263. 
 16. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional? 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1028–29, 1036, 1039, 1041–42, 1134 (2003). 
 17. Id. at 1021–23. 
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approach. Where the survival (or fundamental interest of the state) is 
concerned, there ought to be no holding back on governmental action . . . .18 
Gross concludes that “[t]here may be circumstances when it would be 
appropriate to go outside the legal order, at times even violating otherwise 
accepted constitutional dictates, when responding to emergency situations.”19 
Other theorists reach this same conclusion for similar reasons, including John 
Yoo,20 Thomas Crocker,21 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule,22 and Richard 
Seamon.23 Other scholars disagree with Paulsen. Kevin Jon Heller has pointed 
out there is great danger inherent in the argument that the President alone can 
declare the emergency and determine both the scope of his constitutional 
powers and the appropriateness of the response that he chooses.24 He notes 
how the nature of the emergency that Paulsen believes requires the President to 
override specific constitutional rights shifts in the course of his article from “a 
nation-destroying outcome” to situations where there is merely a “prospect of 
grave risk or danger to the nation.”25 
It was a commonplace of classical political theory that assertions of threats 
of this kind are endemic to constitutional states, since this is the manner in 
which the executive branch of government typically seeks to extend its powers. 
Consequently, constitutional theorists across millennia (many of whom were 
known to and respected by the Framers) have rejected the emergency-based 
rationale for the expansion of executive powers. Indeed, it will be 
demonstrated below that the development of both the notion of constitutional 
government and the rule of law often stems from resistance to these claims on 
the part of consuls, emperors, and kings. 
At the time that Paulsen first made his argument, it appeared as if the 
United States might make a dramatic break with the western constitutional 
tradition. Writing in 2006, Sanford Levinson argued that “[i]t is not, I believe, 
an exaggeration to view us as approaching what Bruce Ackerman has famously 
labeled a ‘constitutional moment,’ with the possibility of attendant 
 
 18. Id. at 1042. 
 19. Id. at 1134. 
 20. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 5, 8–9 (2005). 
 21. Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of Constitutional 
Culture, 61 SMU L. REV. 221, 278 (2008). 
 22. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
605, 644 (2003). 
 23. Richard Henry Seamon, Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists: Presidential 
Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449, 504 (2008). 
 24. Kevin Jon Heller, The Rhetoric of Necessity (Or, Sanford Levinson’s Pinteresque 
Conversation), 40 GA. L. REV. 779, 804 (2006). 
 25. Id. at 788, 790 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1269, 1275). 
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fundamental transformation,”26 brought about by sweeping assertions of 
executive power to ignore the laws during the period of crisis following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.27 
During this period, “President George W. Bush claim[ed] monarchlike 
authority . . . to flout any statute . . . [prohibiting] warrantless electronic 
surveillance, breaking and entering, mail openings or torture.”28 During the 
three years following, however, it appeared as if the legal system had rebuked 
these assertions, after the U.S. Supreme Court penned its decisions in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld29 and Boumediene v. Bush,30 and after the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) repealed the memoranda31 asserting that the President had the 
constitutional power to take the nation to war without congressional 
approval,32 to authorize forms of interrogation that were inconsistent with the 
Convention Against Torture,33 and to ignore laws prohibiting warrantless 
wiretapping.34 It appeared as if jurists had concluded that this vision of 
executive power was incompatible with the vision of separation of powers and 
the rule of law embodied by the Constitution. 
The “constitutional moment” had passed—or so it seemed. In 2011, 
another critical moment seemed to be upon us. The President asserted and 
 
 26. Sanford Levinson, The Deepening Crisis of American Constitutionalism, 40 GA. L. REV. 
889, 891–92 (2006). 
 27. See also David Cole, After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, THE N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/sep/29/after-september-
11-what-we-still-dont-know/. 
 28. Levinson, supra note 26, at 892 (quoting Bruce Fein, Commentary, Hemlock Hallmarks, 
WASH. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2006), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/apr/10/20060410-
091458-8835r/). 
 29. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006). 
 30. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008). 
 31. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office 
of Legal Counsel, Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001, at 2 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/docu 
ments/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf. 
 32. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to the Deputy Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct 
Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm. 
 33. Memorandum Opinion from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Military Interrogation of Alien 
Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States 16, 49 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf; see also 18 U.S.C. § 242 
(2010). 
 34. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National 
Security Agency Described by the President *1, *8 (2006). 
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exercised, on the basis of nothing more than a secret OLC memorandum,35 that 
he has the power to kill an American citizen accused of terrorism without trial, 
in direct violation of the Treason and Bill of Attainder Clauses.36 His Secretary 
of State now asserts37 that the President has the power to continue hostilities 
with a foreign nation in contravention of the War Powers Resolution of 1973,38 
even if Congress were to pass a bill curtailing that mission.39 The fact that John 
Yoo is applauding this assertion of presidential power should give pause to 
those who believe that the threat to the rule of law ended with the election of 
President Obama. Yoo argues persuasively that the administration has 
implicitly adopted his view of the President’s constitutional powers;40 this 
President, or his successor, might as easily adopt Paulsen’s. 
Accordingly, it is now incumbent upon legal historians to return to the 
argument made by Paulsen, Gross, and others who claim that a constitutional 
order logically entails a doctrine of necessity that trumps citizens’ 
constitutional rights. That this task should be entrusted to legal historians is 
supported by Saikrishna Prakash’s excellent analysis of Paulsen’s article.41 
Prakash reasons as follows: 
Paulsen regards it as obvious that any constitution without a rule of necessity is 
deeply flawed. . . . 
  . . . [But] constitutional framers might value other things . . . more than the 
durability of the constitution and the nation. In particular, constitutional 
framers might not wish to frame a constitution that permits the expedient 
sacrifice of such principles, even temporarily. Moreover, constitution-makers 
might believe that officials will violate the constitution on grounds of necessity 
anyway, and that we ought not to multiply those violations by explicitly 
sanctioning what otherwise might occur once in a blue moon.42 
The possibility that the Framers valued the rule of law more than anything 
else should be taken seriously, as they risked being attainted and executed as 
traitors—largely due to their belief that Parliament was violating their 
 
 35. Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
9, 2011, at 1. 
 36. Alford, supra note 7, at 1210–17. 
 37. Charlie Savage, Clock Ticking on War Powers Resolution, THE CAUCUS: THE POLITICS 
AND GOV’T BLOG OF THE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2011, 6:21 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/04/01/clock-ticking-on-war-powers-resolution/. 
 38. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2011). 
 39. Savage, supra note 37. 
 40. John Yoo, Antiwar Senator, War-Powers President, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2011, at A17. 
 41. Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1299, 
1300 (2004). 
 42. Id. 
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constitutional rights as freeborn Englishmen.43 Moreover, Prakash correctly 
notes that this is not merely a question of what any individual founding father 
might have believed; it is a question about the range of opinions upon which 
they might have drawn, such that they could be considered to have left a 
monumentally important question of executive power implicit in a 
constitutional text that is otherwise explicit and restrictive in its treatment of 
delegated powers: 
Paulsen’s claim ultimately rests on the historical understanding of executive 
power . . . . 
  . . . I know of no history suggesting that the executive branch . . . w[as] 
given the constitutional power to suspend [its] constitutions in times of crisis. 
English history, at least, suggests that chief executives enjoyed no such 
power.44 
As this Article will establish, this is indeed a correct assessment of English 
law. However, the Framers were well-read and drew upon many other 
sources.45 As Gross noted, “[I]ssues . . . such as how a constitutional regime 
should respond to violent challenges . . . [are] as ancient as the Roman 
Republic,”46 something which no doubt led him to consider the enduring 
appeal of “[m]axims such as . . . salus populi suprema lex est.”47 Accordingly, 
to rebut Paulsen’s historical oversights more adequately, one should first 
consider in detail Prakash’s claim that “no . . . executive branch [in a 
constitutional government] w[as] given the constitutional power” to dispense 
with the laws in order to protect the public welfare.48 As will be demonstrated 
below, he is correct; from the time of the Roman Republic to the time of the 
Framing, no government that can be considered constitutional (including the 
Roman Principate, the Dominate, the Byzantine Empire, and medieval 
constitutionalist monarchies) has ever embraced a theory of a meta-
constitutional principle which claims that because salus populi suprema lex est 
the executive has the power to dispense with fundamental rights in a crisis. 
 
 43. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 14–17 (1988). 
 44. Prakash, supra note 41, at 1301–02. 
 45. PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750–1776, at 28–29 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 
1965) (“What brought these disparate strands of [intellectual influences] together, what 
dominated the colonists’ miscellaneous learning and shaped it into a coherent whole, was the 
influence of . . . [a] tradition [which] lay in the radical social and political thought of the English 
Civil War and of the Commonwealth period . . . . The colonists identified themselves with these 
seventeenth-century heroes of liberty.”) (emphasis added). 
 46. Gross, supra note 16, at 1014. 
 47. Id. at 1042 (internal quotations omitted). 
 48. Prakash, supra note 41, at 1301–02. 
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B. The Article’s Use of Legal History to Rebut this Argument About 
Necessity 
To demonstrate that none of the constitutional regimes that might have 
served as a precedent for the Framers embraced unbounded executive power to 
defend the salus populi as detailed above, this Article will first address the 
origins of this maxim and its implicit acceptance of the limits of executive 
power, as embodied by the prevailing constitutional norms of Roman law, 
which later served as the foundations upon which all conceptions of monarchic 
and presidential power in western law ultimately rest.49 It will be demonstrated 
that significant constitutional restrictions persisted during the imperial periods, 
which are codified in the Corpus Iuris Civilis and which defined the theory and 
limits of the Byzantine emperors’ powers.50 
This Article will then detail how the theories of imperial power found in 
the Corpus were elaborated upon by late medieval jurists. Building upon 
Roman jurisprudence, these theorists carefully delimited the powers of the 
Pope and Holy Roman Emperor (and later, kings) to prevent them from 
dispensing with the emerging norms of judicial process in emergencies. This 
theory of limitations on regal power, which is called medieval 
constitutionalism,51 had a formative influence on the common law, as can be 
seen in the discussion of the works of Henry of Bracton and Sir John 
Fortescue. 
This Article will then discuss the emergence of a theory of undivided and 
unlimited sovereignty possessed by kings, which is first found in the work of 
the French theorist Jean Bodin, whose revolutionary views supported an 
absolutist French monarchy that abandoned constitutional limits during the 
French Wars of Religion. In England, Bodin’s theories would influence James 
I, Sir Francis Bacon, and Thomas Hobbes. However, as will be detailed below, 
these ideas and the theory of emergency executive powers to defend the 
welfare of the people were rejected and anathemized within Anglo-American 
constitutional theory during the late seventeenth century. 
Even treatises that include a reference to the maxim salus populi suprema 
lex est demonstrate this rejection of broad emergency powers to ignore the 
constitution when defending the state. While Sir Francis Bacon attempted to 
advocate for this theory of the defense of the salus populi, and despite his 
maxims becoming a seminal early source of common law principles, his views 
were rejected in every later collection of maxims, including those that 
influenced the Framers. 
 
 49. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 204 (1983). 
 50. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW 13 (2004). 
 51. See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 14–
17 (1947). 
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Lastly, it will be demonstrated that John Locke’s comments on the salus 
populi do not provide any basis to assume that the Framers could have relied 
upon his views in creating an implied executive power to ignore the 
constitution when protecting the public welfare. Rather they would have read 
him as presenting a diametrically opposite view to Hobbes’s ideas about 
sovereignty, which were universally unpopular among the founders’ 
generation. When confronted with the choice of sovereigntist or 
constitutionalist theory, the Framers clearly chose the latter. Their heroes were 
Locke, Lord Coke, and Sir Matthew Hale, and the villains of their historical 
narrative were Hobbes, James I, and the English politicians who had later 
adopted a theory of an omnipotent parliament. 
The Framers drew upon a diverse set of intellectual influences. Foremost 
among these were the works of enlightenment philosophers such as Locke, the 
common law, the writings of the constitutionalist heroes in the struggle against 
Stuart absolutism, and classical sources. None of these influences would have 
led them to adopt the theory of executive powers to defend the public welfare 
that Paulsen and others believe is implicit within the Constitution of the United 
States. It will be evident at the conclusion of this Article that there is no basis 
to think that the Framers, had they adopted a point of view on executive power 
that entailed a rejection of all their key intellectual influences, would have left 
such a rejection only implicitly in the text of the Constitution. 
II.  CICERO ON SALUS POPULI AND HIS ROMAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
Since the maxim salus populi suprema lex est is thought to have been 
coined by Marcus Tullius Cicero,52 the first task is to understand the meaning 
it was given in De Legibus, which is not a description of the legal order of the 
late republic, but rather a proposal for its reform.53 To appreciate the nature of 
Cicero’s appeal to the idea of public safety, one must put in context his 
proposals for constitutional change. By first detailing the existing Roman 
constitution and earlier hostility to Cicero’s ideas about how it included a 
metaprinciple of self-preservation by the executive, it will be possible to 
explain more adequately what Cicero meant to say later in The Laws and why 
he abandoned his attempts to argue for extraordinary executive powers. 
As will be established in this Part, when Cicero wrote The Laws, the 
Consuls did not possess a constitutional privilege to act outside of the laws to 
safeguard the security of the state, even when the Senate granted them 
emergency powers to deal with serious civil strife. While Cicero had earlier 
been a vocal supporter of the proposition that the constitution did grant the 
 
 52. JON R. STONE, THE ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF LATIN QUOTATIONS 202 (2005). 
 53. ANTHONY EVERITT, CICERO: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ROME’S GREATEST POLITICIAN 
179–80 (2003). 
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Consuls (via the Senate) these sorts of powers in emergencies,54 by this time 
his argument had been decisively rejected.55 Accordingly, by the time that he 
composed The Laws, he was aware that this would not have been a viable 
position, and he did not advocate its adoption.56 
Detailed attention to Cicero’s arguments in the trials of Gaius Rabirius, 
Publius Cornelius Lentulus, and those made in his own defense reveal the 
limited scope of late republican emergency executive. Cicero was foremost a 
rhetorician and an advocate.57 However, he had sought not only to defend his 
clients, but also to urge a program of law reform that included a substantial 
expansion of emergency powers.58 Had this been accepted, late republican 
Rome would have had a constitution of the type that Paulsen and the others 
cited above would clearly approve, as the Consuls would have the same 
implicit powers they believe the President has under the Constitution of the 
United States. Cicero’s arguments, however, were rejected so forcefully that in 
his later efforts at comprehensive law reform, he abandoned this goal.59 One 
must first understand the limited scope of his later proposals before attempting 
to discern the precise meaning of his most quoted phrase. 
A. The Origin of the Maxim in De Legibus 
Cicero wrote The Laws between 51 and 46 B.C.60 In Book Three, he makes 
what he clearly considered plausible proposals for reform, which were not 
radical, but merely “a revived version of the Roman Constitution described in 
the Republic.”61 Nevertheless, some of his proposals are novel, most 
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pertinently his idea that the Senate should have greater powers in 
emergencies.62 However, close attention to the passage where the maxim is 
coined reveals that by 51 B.C., Cicero was no longer advocating for an 
extraordinary executive power to protect the public welfare. 
First, one should note that “the welfare of the people is the supreme law” is 
not an accurate translation of the relevant Latin phrase, which is “ollis salus 
populi suprema lex esto,” and not “salus populi suprema lex est,” (as Gross 
and others render it).63 This paraphrase omits any reference to the vital 
pronoun ollis, which precedes the phrase and to some degree explains it, along 
with the hortatory element of future imperative tense. A better translation, 
then, is as follows: to him (the Consul) the welfare of the people shall be the 
highest principle. Recognizing that this maxim functioned as an exhortation to 
the Consuls is of particular importance to our understanding of its correct 
meaning; examining Cicero’s particular purposes in making the proposals 
found in The Laws is vital. That said, even at this stage one can already see that 
the maxim is not evidence of a principle of constitutional interpretation, since 
it is directed solely at the Consuls. 
This phrase is found in Cicero’s discussion of powers of the Senate, shortly 
before he lays out his proposal for its new emergency powers.64 It is not the 
Senate that is to be guided by this maxim, but rather the Consuls, who are to be 
wholly subordinate to that legislative body.65 It is for this reason that 
commentators normally view the function of the maxim in this section as 
largely rhetorical, as Keyes notes: “The only other possible interpretation—one 
which has been universally rejected as unthinkable—seems to be the literal one 
that Cicero actually intended to place the consuls above the law.”66 
Dyck suggests that this misinterpretation only appears plausible because of 
the “tendency to take lex in this sentence too literally; the suprema lex is surely 
‘the supreme principle’ for their conduct of office.”67 He advances other 
textual evidence for this view, arguing that the phrase is merely a paraphrase of 
a statement of the Consuls’ duties: animum . . . saluti populi consulentem.68 On 
this view, Cicero is admonishing the Consuls to consider the welfare of the 
people and not their own interests when performing their duties. Had he 
believed that their will was law when they perceived a danger to the public, the 
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sections that follow this conclusion would be extraneous. This is not plausible, 
considering the fact that, following the maxim, there are other proposals that 
were of the highest importance to Cicero,69 given his personal stake in debates 
related to emergency powers. 
In the section of The Laws that follows directly after his use of the maxim, 
Cicero describes his proposed procedure for the appointment of a dictator, who 
is to be appointed by the Senate.70 Interestingly, his proposal departs from 
previous precedents, where the Consuls appointed the dictator;71 this would 
have denied the executive one of its traditional emergency powers, by instead 
remitting these to the legislature. Crucially, Cicero also takes pains to 
communicate that the dictator does not have arbitrary authority, by specifying 
that the dictator would have only the powers of the Consuls.72 “Cicero is 
careful to define the power accruing to the . . . dictator . . . with reference to the 
regular ones [the ordinary magistrates].”73 
Cicero limits the Consuls’ powers to those defined by the constitution, 
since it is a fundamental principle for him that “the magistrate’s function is to 
take charge and to issue directives which are right, beneficial, and in 
accordance with the laws. As magistrates are subject to the laws, the people are 
subject to the magistrates.”74 Dyck, who is properly attentive to Cicero’s 
philosophical training and his key influences, traces this view directly to 
Plato’s Laws.75 There, the Greek philosopher wrote that “the ministration of 
the laws must be assigned . . . to that man who is most obedient to the laws 
. . . . [W]herever the law is lord over the magistrates, and the magistrates are 
servants to the law, there I descry salvation and all the blessings that the gods 
bestow on States.”76 
Cicero’s close attention to (and reverence of) Plato’s Laws also makes it 
clear that the meaning of the maxim is found in its function as an imprecation 
to the Consuls. In Plato’s work, the Athenian (who stands in for the author and 
states his views) describes what it is that gives a law its status: 
[W]e deny that laws are true laws unless they are enacted in the interest of the 
common weal of the whole State. But where the laws are enacted in the 
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interest of a section, we call them “feudalities” rather than “polities”; and the 
“justice” they ascribe to such laws is, we say, an empty name.77 
Accordingly, whenever one finds references to the welfare of the people in 
Cicero, one should bear in mind that his primary concern was always the unity 
of the orders that comprise the state,78 and understand that one must read in the 
word “entire” before people. This clarifies that the original purpose of the 
maxim was to express the hope that the Consuls would not use their office to 
advance their own selfish interests, or those of their own class exclusively. The 
contrary interpretation—that it grants emergency powers when the state is in 
danger—has no evidence, and is for this reason, as Keyes noted, “universally 
rejected as unthinkable.”79 
B. Cicero and Emergency Powers in the Late Republic 
It is clear from a careful reading of The Laws that Cicero conceded that 
there should be no implicit constitutional power for the executive to ignore the 
laws when the state was in danger, and that the dictator, while unchecked by an 
executive veto, was equally bound by the laws. Unfortunately, this does not 
resolve the question of whether this power existed at any point during the late 
Roman Republic. While Cicero’s writings do not provide definitive proof on 
this question, evidence related to his political and legal career are quite 
probative. One should begin with a consideration of a dictator’s powers under 
the late republican constitution. This is because although the constitutional 
provisions for the appointment of such a person existed, they are often wrongly 
considered proof that this official would also have the power to operate 
without the constraints of the laws. To that end, the discussion must turn to an 
analysis of the procedures that were developed for dealing with public 
emergencies during this period. 
1. The Scope of Dictatorial and Consular Powers During Public 
Emergencies 
By the time of Cicero’s birth, the procedure for the appointment of a 
dictator had fallen into desuetude, having not been invoked since the end of the 
Punic Wars.80 (This included the emergency precipitated by Hannibal’s 
surprise attack on Rome.81) However, in 82 B.C., Lucius Cornelius Sulla was 
appointed a dictator of an entirely new type, and given broad and 
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unprecedented powers.82 In the wake of a civil war between the populist party 
of Gaius Marius and the Roman oligarchy, the Senate appointed Sulla a 
“[d]ictator for making laws and settling the constitution.”83 After using these 
unprecedented powers to ruthlessly suppress all opposition, Sulla set up a new 
constitutional order, which survived until the end of the Roman Republic.84 
This new regime did not include any procedure for the appointment of 
dictators, and accordingly none were appointed until Caesar was given a 
similarly large mandate “to set the State in order,”85 something which was 
done “[d]espite odious memories of Sulla”86 and which was—to say the 
least—constitutionally problematic. Accordingly, at the time that Cicero was 
writing, it is unclear whether or not a procedure for the appointment of a 
dictator existed at all. Instead, during the period between Sulla and Caesar’s 
reforms, the procedure for dealing with emergencies was known as the senatus 
consultum ultimum.87 This is “[a] declaration of emergency by the Senate, 
which was generally supposed to authorize the magistrates [Consuls] to use 
any means against the public enemies; the right of appeal was temporarily 
suspended.”88 
This definition is largely correct, but must be limited to what it actually 
states, not what it might be thought to imply. The declaration did authorize the 
Consuls to take emergency measures against public enemies, and the right to 
appeal was suspended (something which was eminently reasonable, since 
appeal involved the massing of the comitia centuriata, which consisted of all 
citizens89), but the view that this authorized any and all methods of dealing 
with disorder is incorrect. It is obvious that the right to appeal would not need 
to be abolished if suspects did not have the right to a trial after being captured. 
Closer inspection of the trials related to abuses of emergency powers 
reveals that there were two laws that guaranteed a Roman citizen’s right to a 
trial that could not be overridden by a senatorial decree.90 This conclusion 
seems to follow naturally, since these laws had been passed by the Tribal 
Assembly they could not be overridden by senatus consulta, which could not 
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override a law.91 After these state trials, it was reasserted over the objections of 
Cicero and the optimates that the Senate could not abolish the right to trial by 
passing a consultum ultimum.92 This undoubtedly led Cicero to abandon his 
drive for stronger emergency powers, as evidenced by his more modest 
proposals in The Laws.93 
2. The Trial of Rabirius Reveals the Scope of Roman Emergency Powers 
One of the most sensational trials in Roman history—involving both 
Cicero and Julius Caesar—was the case brought against the Senator Gaius 
Rabirius for personally murdering Lucius Appuleius Saturninus in 100 B.C.94 
Since the killing occurred during a state of emergency declared with a senatus 
consultum ultimum,95 this trial sheds considerable light on the late republican 
constitution. The verdict contradicts the unfortunate modern misinterpretation 
of salus populi supreme lex est—that a threat to the state would allow the 
executive to take any action necessary to protect the existing constitutional 
order. 
In fact, the trial demonstrates that such a broad principle was not part of 
the republican constitution as eminent classicists have concluded: 
[N]either in theory nor in fact did it [the consultum ultimum] add to the legal 
powers which they [the Consuls] already had. It conferred on them no new 
authority nor did it even purport to remove any of the restrictions which were 
imposed by statute on the use of their imperium [i.e., power to punish 
according to law].96 
The facts underlying the trial are as follows. Saturninus, a tribune of the 
plebeians, was declared an enemy of the people by the Senate.97 After 
Saturninus fled to the Capitol, Marius captured Saturninus and imprisoned him 
in the Senate house.98 Marius had intended to put him on trial, but the more 
oligarchic members of his forces instead climbed onto the roof of the Curia 
Hostilia, pried off its roof tiles, and used them to stone Saturninus and the 
other prisoners;99 witnesses would later testify that Rabirius had thrown the 
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fatal tile and that he had carried Saturninus’s head around with him 
afterwards.100 
Thirty-seven years had passed since the murder and the defendant had 
prospered within the Roman oligarchy, attaining senatorial rank and great 
wealth.101 Caesar wanted to shame the oligarchic party for failing to prosecute 
an obvious and scandalous crime.102 Accordingly, Rabirius was not charged 
merely with assassination (sicariis), or high treason (perduello), but with 
scandalous immorality.103 “It was calculated to rally the popular party round 
the ‘unicum libertatis praesidium’ [the defense of the unparalleled palladium 
of Roman liberties] . . . it sounded a significant note of warning, clearly not 
lost upon Cicero, against careless application of martial law by senate or 
consuls, or failure to punish regrettable or illegal incidents.”104 
Rabirius was convicted at trial, but rather than exiling himself to avoid 
execution,105 he exercised his right of provocatio, that is, the right to appeal to 
the people of Rome through the assembly known as the comitia centuriata.106 
Cicero decided to use his defense of Rabirius at this appeal de novo to argue 
for a broad reading of the extraordinary powers granted by the consultum 
ultimum.107 In an audacious attempt to rewrite the constitution of the republic, 
Cicero argued that the consultum gave anyone enforcing it the power to kill a 
prisoner without trial: 
If you admit that Rabirius had the right to take up arms, you must admit that he 
had the right to kill Saturninus . . . . If Rabirius has committed a capital crime 
in taking up arms against Saturninus, what is to be said of all those noble 
patriots who did the same . . . ? There is not a loyal citizen in Rome to-day, 
who is not in the name of Rabirius the subject of a capital charge.108 
The argument was clearly unavailing and numerous classicists have averred 
that Rabirius was about to be convicted by the comitia centuriata.109 Cassius 
Dio concluded that “Rabirius would certainly have been condemned but for the 
intervention of [the Praetor Quintus Caecilius] Metellus [Celer].”110 Metellus 
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hauled down the red flag flying over the guard-post on the Janiculum hill, 
which by custom required the comitia to disperse and for the dismissal with 
prejudice of all pending cases.111 As Sage notes, “By this ruse Rabirius 
escaped conviction.”112 This seems to be clear evidence that the argument that 
an emergency decree allowed Consuls to execute rebels without trial was 
considered extraconstitutional and unacceptable. 
3. The Constitutional Background to Cicero’s Failed Attempt at Legal 
Reform 
To understand why Cicero’s argument was unacceptable to the Romans, 
one must explore the state of civil liberties and due process in the late 
republican period and how it created a palladium of liberties that were held in 
high esteem by the populace. Owing to periods of struggle between the various 
social classes, members of Rome’s lower orders had demanded a manifold of 
procedural safeguards.113 
These laws included the lex Valeria, which required granting an appeal to 
the people after any conviction on a capital charge.114 One of these laws 
effectively converted death sentences into internal exile, since it allowed the 
defendant to flee before sentence would be passed.115 The leges Porciae 
explicitly provided for the trial and punishment of magistrates who attempted 
to circumvent the Valerian laws,116 and the lex Sempronia ne quis iudicio 
circumveniatur forbade the creation of special courts or judicial commissions, 
even during periods of turmoil or after emergency decrees were passed.117 
These laws were so prized that their violation was thought to be not only 
wrong, but also sacrilegious.118 This is evident from the fact that Caesar was 
able to revive a special procedure involving duumviri perduellionis for the 
prosecution of Rabirius, which was justified by reference to the fact that the 
murder was so scandalous that it angered the gods.119 
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There is no inherent tension between the principles of due process 
embodied in these laws and the consulta ultimum when the powers these 
decrees granted to the Consuls are properly understood. The law that allowed 
for these emergency measures to be passed by the Senate was understood to 
authorize only action “in strict conformity . . . [to what had been done by 
Lucius] Opimius,”120 who had led the forces of order in the wake of the death 
of the populist Gaius Graccus.121 It had been held that “Opimius did not violate 
the lex Sempronia when he killed Gracchus iniussu populi [without the 
command of the people speaking the comitia centuriata], because the latter 
was . . . an open enemy under arms.”122 Accordingly, as Hardy noted: 
If, therefore, there was a state of war in the city, and riotous citizens with arms 
in their hands threatened the safety of the state, the senate was justified in 
passing its decree . . . . The consuls were then justified in “calling the people to 
arms”, putting themselves at its head, and carrying into effect the state of war. 
It followed that all riotous citizens who were killed by members of this armed 
force acting under the consuls’ order, lost their lives as overt enemies of the 
state—perduelles [traitors]—so that neither the Sempronian law requiring trial 
by the people, nor the Porcian law requiring appeal, was applicable to the 
case.123 
Hardy argues that this was the common understanding of the scope of the 
powers conferred by the consulta.124 The popular rejection of Cicero’s theory 
at the conclusion of Rabirius’s trial—that the decree authorized any action in 
defense of the state—reveals that a consultum did not allow every 
constitutional provision to be broken in defense of the state, and also reveals 
the limitations of the precedent set by the approval of Opimius’s acts. One 
must note that “Saturninus on surrendering and being made prisoner had 
ceased to be an open perduellis in arms against the State, whose safety 
demanded his instant death,” and that accordingly Rabirius had been found 
guilty for murdering him.125 This was only possible if the Roman people 
understood that the Senate’s decree did not absolve anyone acting pursuant to 
its authorization to break the law, but only to kill rebels “with arms in their 
hands” in open battle.126 As the next subsection will demonstrate, even Cicero 
needed to accept that this was the correct interpretation later that year when the 
Senate called upon him personally to take the field against rebels, pursuant to a 
consultum ultimum. 
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4. The Catilinarian Conspiracy Reveals a Consultum Ultimum’s 
Limitations 
In 63 B.C., another populist conspiracy to overthrow the republic was 
alleged.127 Catiline was said to have been plotting along with a rebel army in 
Etruria to seize the city.128 Cicero, by then Consul, denounced Catiline in a 
series of famous orations even before hard evidence came into his hands.129 In 
these blistering speeches, he “constantly reiterate[ed]” that “Catiline and his 
associates were hostes [enemies of the state].”130 Cicero obtained what 
appeared to be solid proof of the conspiracy from Fabius Sanga.131 
Subsequently, Catiline’s second-in-command, the praetor Publius Cornelius 
Lentulus and his associates were seized by Cicero’s men.132 By this point 
Cicero had secured the consultum ultimum from the Senate, which authorized 
him to use lethal force against armed enemies.133 
Following the precedent set in Rabirius’s trial, Cicero should have turned 
Lentulus over to the magistrates. After a verdict, Lentulus would have had the 
right to choose either exile or appeal that sentence to the people. If Cicero 
really believed that this was not the correct interpretation of the law, he could 
have followed Rabirius’s example and simply killed his prisoners. Realizing 
that this second choice was too dangerous, Cicero instead attempted to expand 
the powers granted under the emergency decree to abrogate the procedural 
protections of the Porcian and Valerian laws, but in a novel way. His solution 
was to put the question to the Senate, which he argued was a duly empowered 
court of justice.134 
Cicero suggested that the Senate had a right to convict and sentence 
Lentulus and his associates rather than to execute them pursuant to his own 
consular power after the decree, despite the urgings of other members of the 
oligarchic party.135 He “asserted that all the leges de provocatione [the Porcian 
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law requiring appeals to the people of capital sentences] were for the 
protection of the citizens only, and that those who attempted flagrantly to 
overthrow the republic ceased, by that very act, to be citizens, and were 
accordingly no longer under the protection of the laws.”136 However, Cicero 
proved “unwilling to take upon himself the responsibility of deciding their [the 
prisoners’] fate[s], even though backed by the consultum ultimum. He has 
determined that the [S]enate is to be the court for the trial of the case of these 
conspirators.”137 By suggesting the Senate try Lentulus, Cicero was accepting 
that the conspirators retained the benefit of the laws.138 This was tacit 
acceptance of the holding in Rabirius’s case. 
If the people accepted Cicero’s proposition that the Senate was a duly 
constituted court, it would also protect him from the charge that he was 
violating the Sempronian law, which “forb[ade] the appointment of 
extraordinary judicial commissions with power to impose a capital 
sentence.”139 Unfortunately for Cicero, this interpretation of the Sempronian 
law was untenable, and would be vigorously rejected by Julius Caesar in a 
speech before the Senate.140 Hardy highlights Caesar’s “ignoring of Cicero’s 
precedents [for a trial before the Senate], and the insistence that a novum 
exemplum is involved . . . . [and making a] veiled warning [of illegality] 
contained in the reference to the lex Porcia.”141 
After Cato the Younger intervened in the debate and bolstered his resolve, 
Cicero ordered that Lentulus and the other prisoners be strangled in their 
cells.142 This reckless action led to serious consequences. The Tribune of the 
Plebeians moved against Cicero, forbidding Cicero from addressing the people 
on the grounds “that he had put Roman citizens to death untried.”143 Hardy 
agrees with this conclusion: “It was obviously no adequate defence to say that 
the senate had passed its last decree [consultum ultimum]. . . . That in itself was 
neither an order nor even a permission to break a fundamental law.”144 This 
also follows from Rabirius’s trial. 
Later, Publius Clodius Pulcher responded to this extrajudicial execution by 
introducing a plebiscite to the Plebian Council, which subsequently became a 
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law.145 The lex Clodia de civibus romanis interemptis authorized prosecutions 
of any official who executed a Roman citizen without trial.146 Cicero believed 
that it was directed at him personally, so he went into voluntary exile before he 
could be charged.147 As Botsford notes, there was nothing novel about this law, 
it was simply a recognition that the fundamental laws were not suspended by 
the consultum ultimum: “Notwithstanding Cicero’s repeated denunciations of 
the unconstitutionality of the latter act [the Clodian law], the tribunician 
assembly, in passing it, kept itself strictly within the limits of precedent.”148 
Cicero never really recovered from the stain of these executions.149 
Instead, he retreated into literary affairs, writing his best-known works.150 As 
described in subsection one above, in The Laws, one can see that he decisively 
rejected the position of the extremists within the oligarchic party that the salus 
populi allowed the Consuls to execute citizens without trial or appeal, even 
after a declaration of a public emergency. Additionally, these arguments were 
decisively rejected by the people of Rome when they prepared to sentence 
Rabirius and when they passed the Clodian law. Accordingly, one can 
conclude that there is simply no support for the proposition that the republican 
constitution contained a meta-principle that empowered the executive branch 
to ignore the principles of due process when defending the welfare of the 
people. 
III.  THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION AND MEDIEVAL RULE OF LAW 
One might argue that the real legacy of the Roman law stems not from the 
comparatively brief Late Republican Period but rather from the Imperial 
Period, which was not only considerably longer but gave birth to the legal 
codes that would have the greatest influence on the formation of the Western 
legal tradition—in particular the Corpus Iuris Civilis.151 Such an observer 
might also argue that even if the maxim of salus populi suprema lex est was 
not embedded into the republican constitution, it may have been a part of the 
imperial constitution, as the emperor must have had the power to act whenever 
he thought it was necessary to preserve the public welfare. As will be shown 
below, this supposition has no support. 
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The popular understanding of the power of the emperor is that it was 
unbounded.152 This ignores the fact that the Roman citizenry justified their 
opposition to emperors by arguing that they did not rule in accordance with the 
laws.153 The distinction between a king (or an emperor) and a tyrant was 
already a popular topos in antiquity,154 and thus it was essential for the 
imperial constitution to define legal boundaries for the exercise of the 
emperor’s powers. Accordingly, “[t]he emperor was on principle bound by the 
law,” and “[t]his classical law remained in force until A.D. 533,”155 when the 
Digest became the law of the empire.156 Paulus is perfectly clear on this 
point:157 “Testamentum, in quo imperator heres scriptus est, inofficiosum argui 
potest: eum enim qui leges facit pari maiestate legibus obtemperare 
convenit.”158 Ulpian expressed the same opinion.159 
Unfortunately, this understanding has been clouded by the erroneous belief 
that Ulpian also advanced very strong opinions to the contrary. He has been 
associated with the opinion that “[t]he emperor is not bound by statutes,”160 
and second, that “[a] decision given by the emperor has the force of a 
statute.”161 This is assumed to be correct since the Digest asserts that these 
were his views. However, to understand imperial constitutional theory 
correctly, one must pay much closer attention to both the nature of this code 
and the society that produced it. 
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A. Understanding That the Corpus Iuris Civilis Is Not an Accurate Reflection 
of Even the Late Imperial Constitution 
The Digest was promulgated in 534, more than a century after the fall of 
the West.162 It was commissioned by Justinian to serve as the law of the 
Eastern Roman Empire.163 One must also remember that the East had always 
been culturally different, as it was more influenced by the Hellenistic 
civilization that it had displaced than by the mos maiorum particular to 
Rome.164 The code was compiled by Tribonian after centuries of cultural and 
political divergence from Rome, and it was not an entirely straightforward 
compilation of traditional Roman legal principles.165 
Fritz Schulz has conclusively demonstrated that the above two statements, 
attributed to Ulpian in the Digest, are not authentic. He noted that during 
Ulpian’s era, the emperors derived their authority from the lex de imperio 
Vespansiani,166 which, as its name indicates, invests the emperor with the 
imperium of a Roman magistrate.167 As for the first assertion, that the emperor 
was not bound by the laws, Schulz demonstrated that Ulpian had actually said 
only that he was not bound by one law—the caduca ex lege Papia,168 which 
pertained to inheritance rights (the emperor had been given a special 
dispensation from this law by statute).169 As for the second statement, that 
whatever pleased the ruler had the force of law, Schulz presented textual 
evidence that shows that Ulpian had stated merely that the emperor had a 
“strictly limited power” to enact certain laws pursuant to the Vespasian 
imperial law (analogous to the President’s power to promulgate executive 
orders).170 
As the emperor was required to follow the laws, no argument can be made 
for the proposition that the maxim at issue was any stronger in the empire than 
in the republic.171 However, the inclusion of these views attributed to Ulpian in 
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the Digest raises the question of whether or not a Byzantine emperor might 
have had emergency powers to ignore the laws when acting for the public 
welfare, and if so, whether this constitutional principle was transmitted via the 
Corpus to the jurists of the Middle Ages. 
B. The Structure of Byzantine Imperial Power 
When Tribonian and his collaborators wrenched these citations out of 
context, they were attempting to bring the Roman theory of imperium (which 
was a legal construct) together with Hellenistic ideas about the power of the 
king, namely that he is a law unto himself. These eastern ideas were 
“[contrary] to the ideas of the Augustan principate,”172 which also undergirded 
those of the Dominate, by way of the Vespasian imperial law.173 Accordingly, 
they were “not the Roman constitutional law of the third century . . . [which] 
was not superseded earlier than Justinian.”174 These views, promulgated in a 
more explicit and forceful form in Justinian’s New Laws, were the foundation 
not of the Roman, but rather the Byzantine theory of imperial powers, and 
“[b]y this passage the Hellenistic conception of the emperor as the animated 
law was handed down to the middle ages.”175 
It is important to note that the Byzantine emperors did not obtain absolute 
power despite the statements from the novels referenced above, as will be 
demonstrated here. There was a clear tension in its theory of the emperor’s 
powers owing to the inclusion of another passage derived from a declaration of 
Theodosius and Valentinian included in the Digest: this law, which is known 
as Digna Vox, would prove to be of singular importance to both Byzantine and 
medieval conceptions of a ruler’s power, serving as “a touchstone for juristic 
discussions of the prince’s obligations to respect cause and norms.”176 It holds 
that: 
  For a sovereign to acknowledge himself bound by the laws is a statement 
befitting the majesty of a ruler, and, therefore, our authority depends upon the 
authority [of] law. And for a sovereign to submit himself to the laws, is in fact 
a greater thing than imperial power. And by the announcement of the present 
edict we show what we do not permit ourselves to do.177 
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Here, it is evident that even an emperor who derives some of his 
legitimacy from Hellenistic ideas about kingship must be aware that he still 
cannot govern in the manner of a tyrant. However, given that an emperor, 
unlike a consul, cannot be prosecuted or impeached, how can he be said to be 
subject to the laws? The solution was for the sovereign to bind himself. Under 
“Justinian’s Corpus iuris the emperor was . . . legally not subjected to the law. 
Morally, however, he was regarded as under an obligation to observe it: a 
number of pre-Justinian texts containing this principle were inserted in the 
Corpus iuris.”178 Hence, it cannot be said that the Byzantine emperor could 
dispense with the laws when the public welfare required it. This principle was 
reaffirmed and transmitted. 
C. The Transmission of Byzantine Ideas About Imperium to the Middle Ages 
When discussing the reception of the Roman law in the Middle Ages, one 
must bear in mind that although the Corpus Iuris Civilis formed a significant 
part of the substrate of medieval law, it was not the sole source of early 
medieval ideas about kingship.179 Outside of a Hellenistic cultural context, 
Greek ideas had considerably less appeal. The idea that a king would be above 
the law was alien to the Germanic tribes that occupied what had been the 
Western Roman Empire, where rulers obtained their powers pursuant to 
complex laws of succession that involved popular consent.180 Thus, it is not 
surprising that their hybrid systems of law (for example, the Lex 
Burgundiorum and Isidore of Seville’s Lex Visigothorum Reccesvindiana) 
were hostile to absolute powers.181 Under Isidore’s code, the king is put on a 
par with the people and is therefore not only morally but also “legally bound to 
observe the law.”182 This weaker conception of royal powers was transmitted 
to England, where it figures prominently in the work of John of Salisbury and 
Bracton.183 
Medieval theorists conceptualizing the tension between the king’s duty to 
observe the laws and to protect the people noted that Aquinas had not resolved 
the issue perfectly.184 The theologian had left open the door to the argument 
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that a medieval king, in protecting the common good, is not bound (either 
legally, in classical Roman practice, or morally, according to Byzantine 
precedent) by the laws when emergencies require extra-legal action. 
This question was resolved differently across Europe, but the clearest 
response to this thorny question in medieval legal theory can be found in 
English jurisprudence. Bracton was “a serious student of Roman law” who 
“wished to point out that St. Isidore’s doctrine was in conformity to Roman 
law. . . . In truth Bracton’s opinion was indubitably that the king was legally 
bound by the law . . . .”185 Bracton, like other “Romanistic outsiders” (such as 
Franciscus Accursius) used arguments derived from Ulpian’s Edicts when 
concluding that “the law is above the king.”186 He also cited the Digna Vox as 
evidence on this point, relying upon the literal wording of the original text.187 
Bracton apparently translated Theodosian and Valentinian’s order as “[t]he 
emperors declare that henceforth the emperor is legally bound by the law.”188 
Relying upon Azo, Bracton also concluded that since the law created the king, 
he must make a tribute in return by obeying the laws.189 
One should also note that Bracton’s comments might have been given an 
even stronger reading than he had intended owing to the realities of English 
politics. (Interpolations into text “D” of Bracton argue that “[i]f the king is 
regardless of law then the counts and barons must interfere” which justifies 
placing the king underneath a council of his nobles of the type originally 
contemplated by the original Magna Carta’s clause 61.)190 Bracton’s English 
reading of Roman law inclined itself against absolutism, but even civilians in 
such bastions of Roman law had resisted the more absolutist interpretations of 
the Corpus. 
The key problem was “when and under what circumstances could the 
prince set aside, distort, or ignore the rules of the legal system(s) that he was 
normally obligated to preserve and uphold?”191 Pennington concluded that 
despite the reception of the quasi-absolutist misreadings of Ulpian, “[J]urists 
besieged the fortress of absolute power by investing it with judicial norms, 
natural law, reason, custom, privilege, obligations, in effect, the ‘constitution’ 
of the realm.”192 To determine whether under these constitutional orders the 
king possessed emergency powers of the type that would allow us to conclude 
that the maxim at issue here had the status of a constitutional or meta-
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constitutional principle one must consider whether the rights created by these 
constitutions were absolute, in a manner that prevented their abridgment even 
during emergencies. 
IV.  MEDIEVAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CREATION OF DUE PROCESS 
During the late Middle Ages, principles of due process emerged that 
prevented rulers from using emergency measures against subjects that did not 
comply with emerging norms of judicial procedure. Although many rulers 
attempted to create and invoke exceptions where the public welfare was at 
stake, medieval jurists rejected their arguments. Accordingly, it became clear 
that the rulers were legally bound to observe these limits, or face the allegation 
of tyranny and resistance from their subjects that would be viewed as 
justifiable. 
These developments can be found in both England and continental Europe. 
On the continent, the jurisprudence of the Holy Roman Empire and the papal 
rescripts defined constitutional limits on emergency powers; in England, the 
boundaries of executive power were decisively shaped by the Magna Carta and 
the statutes that bolstered its status as a fundamental law. Other statutes closed 
any loopholes that might have allowed for the development of royal power to 
protect the public when the state was allegedly in crisis. 
A. Checks on Imperial Authority in the Law of the Holy Roman Empire 
Before the thirteenth century, continental rulers had sometimes asserted 
that they had a right to abrogate what modern observers would consider due 
process when they deemed it necessary. These views were not without some 
scholarly support, especially when the ruler in question was the Pope. 
Hostiensis, who promulgated an absolutist theory of the Pope’s powers,193 
cited Roman law in support of his argument that since criminal procedure was 
merely a feature of the positive law—not part of the natural law—the entire 
trial could be dispensed with when the defendant’s crimes were notorious.194 
Had this principle been accepted within the emerging medieval constitutional 
order, one could conclude that early medieval jurisprudence had indeed 
contained a constitutional metaprinciple that salus populi suprema lex est. 
However, the argument that the right to a trial was merely a feature of the 
positive law195 was rejected in the second half of the thirteenth century by 
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jurists who “began to argue that the ordo iudicarius (the normal trial 
procedure) was not derived from civil law, but from natural law.”196 
Stephen of Tournai described the ordo iudicarius in this manner: 
  The defendant shall be summoned before his own judge and be 
legitimately called by three edicts or one peremptory edict. He must be 
permitted to have legitimate delays. The accusation must be formally presented 
in writing. Legitimate witnesses must be produced. A decision may only be 
rendered only after someone has been convicted or confessed.197 
Even before these jurists made it clear that no emergency could authorize a 
ruler to dispense with the requirement of a trial, Pope Innocent III had 
“maintained that a prince could not abolish the judicial process or ignore an 
action because he was bound by natural law to render justice.”198 Hostiensis, 
when coming to the opposite conclusion, had “left out the crucial passage . . . 
[and] shortened Innocent’s comments almost to the point of 
incomprehensibility.”199 Accordingly, “although [Hostiensis] concurred with 
Innocent that the pope should never pervert the ordo iudicarius and was 
always obligated to render justice . . . Hostiensis emphasized the occasions 
when the pope could subvert due process. ”200 
Perhaps due to his misuse of Innocent’s arguments, Hostiensis’s opinion 
was not adopted by subsequent jurists, who concurred with Innocent on 
different grounds. Citing Roman precedent, Odofredis de Denariis argued that 
since the emperor could never take away that which belonged to a person 
without legal process, nor could any ruler take away the right to legal 
process.201 Guido of Suzzara agreed, and following Accursius202 argued that a 
statute that purported to do so would be void.203 Through the works of 
anonymous commentators and Guido’s student, Jacobus de Arena (who later 
taught at Bologna, Padua, and Toulouse), this view became widely 
influential.204 
In the jurisprudence of the early fourteenth century, one can observe signs 
that these formative constitutionalist ideas about the rule of law were spreading 
across Europe and being used to explicitly rule out exceptions to the 
requirements of due process. Johannes Monachus undercut the idea that the 
procedural norms could be dispensed with even when the crime was notorious. 
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He concluded in his commentary on Pope Boniface VIII’s Rem Non Novam 
that not even the Pope—who had the most power of all rulers to ignore 
positive laws—could proceed against a defendant who had not been served 
with a summons, even when the crime was notorious.205 In those 
circumstances, “[T]he judge may proceed in a summary fashion in some parts 
of the process, but the summons and [public] judgment must be observed.”206 
Guilielmus Durantis agreed: “[T]hose accused of notorious crimes should have 
a proper trial.”207 
This principle became entrenched in the still-developing ius commune 
during the fourteenth century and is prominent in the juristic commentary on 
the struggle between the Holy Roman Emperor Henry VII and King Robert of 
Naples. In 1312, Henry decided to bring charges of treason against Robert, 
alleging that his vassal was guilty of treason for having stirred up resistance to 
imperial rule over traditionally Guelph cities in northern Italy.208 Henry 
summoned Robert to answer the charges, but he claimed that the summons 
could not be delivered personally due to the danger of bandits on the roads.209 
Henry then declared that he still had the power to proceed against Robert 
under these circumstances. In a decree entitled Ad Reprimendum, he “decreed 
that whoever committed the crime of treason . . . could be condemned in 
absentia in summary proceedings.”210 Henry justified his condemnation of 
Robert as follows: “Robert’s crimes were public and notorious . . . . Robert did 
not appear for the hearing, and having heard and recorded the testimony of 
witnesses, we condemned him in an interlocutory judgment. We now make this 
judgment [that Robert be beheaded and his lands confiscated] definitive.”211 
Henry’s assertions of his own powers conflicted with jurisprudence stating that 
rulers had no power to dispense with summons. The jurists of his day did not 
take kindly to his assertions. 
Commentaries on this dispute establish that the prevailing legal opinion 
was solidly against Henry: “The tracts defending Robert and the papacy far 
outnumber those supporting Henry VII.”212 Following Monachus, Oldradus de 
Ponte argued in his consilia that a judgment rendered without giving the 
defendant a chance to defend himself was invalid: “[T]he prince could not 
deny a subject the right to due process because it was grounded in natural 
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law.”213 Other jurists followed in the same vein, arguing that “[o]ne may not 
object that the emperor is a ‘legibus solutus’ and can, therefore, particularly for 
the crime of treason, omit a summons and proceed to judgment.”214 
These responses to the struggle between Henry and Robert generated 
precedents that were then developed further within the ius commune. For 
instance, Nicholaus de Orsone “disputed the right of the King of Sicily to 
allow royal judges to proceed against notorious suspects of violent crimes 
without a hearing in the interest of public order.”215 This catalyzed the creation 
of general norms that undermine any assertion that the prince had the power to 
dispense with due process when the welfare of the state required it. 
Responding favorably to these jurists’ consilia in the constitution known as 
Saepe Contingit,216 Pope Clement V set the limits beyond which summary 
procedures for emergency matters could not exceed, for instance in omitting 
the summons and the opportunity to present a defense.217 This document 
“came to form the substratum of most of the modern Continental systems” of 
procedure.218 “The canonists were quick to gloss the Clementines [a later 
collection issued by Pope John XXII that included Saepe] and incorporate its 
provisions into the ius commune.”219 
These collections were received, accepted, and glossed by the most 
prominent fifteenth- century commentators.220 Although there were jurists who 
did not agree with the principle that due process could not be abrogated in the 
interest of public order,221 they were “completely out of step with the 
jurisprudence of the ius commune,” as the mainstream had “rejected any 
infringement on the right to due process.”222 By 1479, “two centuries of 
Romano-canonical procedure law . . . [held] these procedural rules [forbidding 
condemnation without summons and defense] were not just part of positive 
canon law, but were based on a higher, natural law” which could not be 
ignored.223 Accordingly, in his defense of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Francesco 
Accolti (then acknowledged as the greatest living jurist) argued that Pope 
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Sixtus IV had no right to condemn Lorenzo, since “[n]either the pope nor the 
emperor can dispense with this part of the judicial process because no one can 
ignore a precept of divine law.”224 
B. From Bracton to Fortescue: English Restrictions on the Executive in the 
Late Medieval Era 
1. Bracton’s Insistence That the Law Is Superior to the King 
Late medieval commentary on the powers of the English king begins with 
the reaction to the work of Henry of Bracton (who was Guido of Suzzara’s 
contemporary). Like Guido, Bracton was concerned with establishing the fact 
that the king was subject to the laws. While he conceded that the king has no 
superior225 (in a passage that has been frequently been misunderstood as a 
statement extolling royal authority),226 Bracton asserted that “in spite of his 
general authority, the king enjoys no privilege when he is the plaintiff in a law-
suit . . . the judge has to give his judgment just as if the plaintiff were the 
humblest of the king’s subjects.”227 More importantly, Bracton argued that the 
king is limited to using the laws, which give him no advantage against even the 
least of his citizens: “[F]or the king is beneath no man, but under God and the 
law.”228 This argument sets the tone for the development of a significant body 
of English medieval jurisprudence that established that the king has no 
extraordinary power to convict, attaint, or otherwise punish his subjects outside 
of the channels of due process. 
Following Isidore of Seville, Bracton concluded that the king must observe 
not only the divine laws; he must also observe the human laws of the Corpus 
iuris that had bound the emperor.229 He combined this view with his 
interpretation of Digna Vox (and of Azo and the decretals of Innocent III 
described above) and concluded that the king was not merely morally, but also 
legally bound to observe the laws.230 His views had a formative effect on 
English legal thought: Bracton “does not stand alone with this interpretation 
[of the king’s legal duty to observe the law]. . . . [I]t may be observed that in 
later times his interpretation was defended by writers on public law.”231 An 
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interpolated text long thought to be authentic232 endorses the creation of an 
enforcement mechanism should the king fail to govern according to the 
laws.233 This appears to be an endorsement of the security clause of the 
original Magna Carta.234 
2. The Magna Carta as Touchstone of English Constitutionalist Thought 
Late medieval constitutionalism was no more popular with the Plantagenet 
kings than with the Holy Roman Emperors, and accordingly, thirteenth and 
fourteenth century England saw many attempts by its kings to liberate 
themselves of the strictures of law. King John appealed almost immediately to 
Innocent III for a bill that would declare the Great Charter invalid;235 this was 
almost inevitable, since it unambiguously “placed the law higher than the 
King” by imposing a clear “limitation on the power of the sovereign.”236 
Obviously, this purported invalidation did not settle the issue. First, the 
“reasons the pontiff gave for annulling the Charter were not the model of 
lawyerly clarity.”237 Second, the idea behind the Magna Carta managed to 
endure and grow, as Richard Helmholz asserted: 
  Despite its imperfections, Magna Carta survived. More than survive, it 
flourished. It outlasted the death of King John, annulment by Pope Innocent 
III, and revisions pruning the extent of the powers granted to the barons. It 
assumed first place in the book of English statutes, served as a touchstone of 
the liberties of the English nation during constitutional conflicts of later 
centuries, and came in time to stand as a symbol of the rule of law against 
tyranny by the state.238 
Edward Corwin suggested that the Charter grew in significance because it had 
been “cast into a milieu favoring growth,”239 something which is evidenced by 
the scope of legal commentary on the Corpus iuris and the incorporation of 
these anti-absolutist provisions into the ius commune. However, in England, 
“[Its] successful maintenance . . . demanded the cooperation of all classes and 
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so the participation of all classes in its benefits,”240 something which 
contributed to the extra appeal and durability of these principles within English 
law. 
The Great Charter was reissued as a concession to the Barons a year after 
King John’s death by the supporters of his son Henry III—who himself would 
later be forced to call the first Parliament.241 This suggests how important the 
idea that the king was subject to the law had grown in a short time. Corwin’s 
assertion of the appeal of the Charter of Liberties to all classes was confirmed 
when it was reissued by Henry III in 1225; Article 29’s application to all “free 
[men]” was taken to mean that it granted liberties far beyond the knightly 
class.242 The people’s desire for its liberties led them to pay the high price that 
Henry charged for its reconfirmation—one fifteenth of every subject’s 
moveable goods.243 
The Charter’s power was greatly expanded through its reconfirmation by 
Edward I, when in the Confirmation of Charters he ordered that: 
[A]ll “justices, sheriffs, mayors, and other misters which under us and by us 
have the laws of our land to guide,” to treat the Great Charter as “common 
law,” in all pleas before them. Furthermore, any judgment contrary to the 
Great Charter . . . was to be “holden for naught”; and all archbishops and 
bishops were to pronounce “the sentence of Great Excommunication against 
all those that by deed, aid or counsel” proceeded “contrary to the aforesaid 
[Charter].”244 
Once again, an English king had made it clear that there could be no dispute 
whether he was bound by the laws. However, it was during the reign of 
Edward’s grandson, Edward III, that the charter achieved its medieval zenith. 
In exchange for the taxes necessary to wage the Hundred Years’ War, 
Edward III confirmed the Charter no less than fifteen times, a process that was 
motivated by “a desire to get the king’s acknowledgement in general that he 
was bound by the law.”245 Thanks in part to his repeated affirmations, this 
principle was no longer disputable in England during the late Middle Ages 
after Edward’s reign. The most important reaffirmations were the “six statutes” 
interpreting Clause 29.246 The most important of these is the 1354 Statute of 28 
 
 240. Id. at 176. 
 241. Parliament, in HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 403 (Ronald H. 
Fritze & William B. Robison eds., 2002). See also WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA 
CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 154 (2d ed. 1914). 
 242. Corwin, supra note 239, at 177. 
 243. MCKECHNIE, supra note 241, at 154. 
 244. Corwin, supra note 239, at 177–78 (quoting SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH HISTORY 
86–87 (George Burton Adams & Henry Morse Stephens eds., 1911)). 
 245. G. B. Adams, The Origin of the English Constitution, II, 13 THE AM. HIST. REV. 713, 
721 n.15 (1908). 
 246. RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA: THROUGH THE AGES 123 (2003). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] IS AN INVIOLABLE CONSTITUTION A SUICIDE PACT? 389 
Edward III.247 Chapter Three of this statute states that “no man of what estate 
or condition that he be, shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken, nor 
imprisoned, nor put to death without being brought in answer by due process 
of the law.”248 This reinforced the Charter, which stated that: 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or 
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other 
way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, 
except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.249 
It was now abundantly clear that Magna Carta’s guarantees of due process 
applied without exception. Parliament also acted repeatedly to ensure the 
protections of the Great Charter (as clarified and extended by the six statutes) 
were made more durable. The 1368 Statute of 42 Edward III established (as 
Coke noted in his Institutes) that any future statutes that purported to narrow 
the protections of the Magna Carta would be null and void.250 This shows that 
already by 1368, the Charter had become a critical element of the legal 
tradition of England, which now contained rights that were permanent and 
inviolable. Chapter Three of the statute states that “no man [shall] be put to 
answer . . . [except] according to the old law of the land. And if anything from 
henceforth be done to the contrary, it shall be void in the law, and holden for 
error.”251 
Additionally, Parliament attempted to ensure that the people were aware of 
the protections of the Charter and ready to enforce their rights. Repeatedly, it 
demanded that the king have the Magna Carta read out by his officials point by 
point, that officials take oaths to uphold it, and that they be held accountable 
when it was broken.252 The clergy were also called upon to excommunicate 
those who offended it.253 It appears to be beyond dispute that Coke was right 
when he asserted that by the conclusion of the reign of Edward III the Magna 
Carta had attained the status of fundamental law; in modern terms, it was now 
part of England’s unwritten constitution.254 
After the reign of Edward III, the abuses of the early Plantagenet monarchs 
were considered a source of shame for the English state and a salutary 
reminder that the rule of law bound the king even in the most extreme 
circumstances. The execution without trial of various rebels before the passage 
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of the Edwardian law of treason and the six statutes of due process—which 
now clearly barred this practice, and made it clear that Magna Carta contained 
no exceptions for those accused of treason—were seen as bad precedents and 
repudiated.255 This was true even for the case of Roger Mortimer, who had 
deposed and murdered Edward II.256 A clearer example of treason could 
scarcely be imagined, but his execution without due process was now held to 
be odious and contrary to Magna Carta, such that Parliament was subsequently 
eager to differentiate posthumous bills of attainder from Mortimer’s 
sentence.257 
While the late Plantagenets would clearly have preferred to govern as 
absolute monarchs, that was now impossible: “[T]he royal power was 
decisively curbed by [the reconfirmed] Magna Carta.”258 By the fifteenth 
century, they could not appeal the logic of an emergency power to defend the 
salus populi in the event to open treason and civil war, since this had now been 
decisively rejected within English legal theory, and where now “the illegal 
execution even of an outlawed felon could cause considerable outcry”259 from 
the legal profession and the nobles, who remembered how they had been 
oppressed by means of extraconstitutional assertions of emergency powers by 
Edward II. The elevation of the Magna Carta to the status of fundamental law 
and the condemnation of the sentencing of traitors contrary to its provisions 
made it clear that the King of England possessed no power to ignore the 
constitution even when confronted with serious threats to the state. 
3. Fortescue’s The Governance of England as Constitutionalist Thought 
The final reconfirmation of the Magna Carta occurred in 1423, shortly 
after the accession to the throne of Henry VI, who had became king at nine 
months of age when his father, Henry V, died while on campaign in France.260 
This was done to secure popular consent to the regency council headed by his 
uncles, who in doing so affirmed their commitment to the principles of 
medieval constitutionalism.261 The later Plantagenets and Lancastrian kings 
had been required to govern in a constitutional manner, as the consent of the 
people had become more important to effective governance due to the endemic 
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labor shortages created by the Black Death.262 At the dawning of the early 
modern era, however, England again faced challenges from rulers who sought 
to depart from the established constitutionalist consensus.263 
At this moment, England’s leading jurist felt compelled to write a text that 
best demonstrates the full flowering of late medieval constitutionalism. Sir 
John Fortescue, Lord Chief Justice of England under Henry VI from 1442, had 
been driven into exile along with his king during the Wars of the Roses. From 
1468 to 1470, he wrote a treatise entitled The Governance of England: 
Otherwise Called the Difference Between an Absolute and a Limited Monarchy 
(hereinafter Governance).264 Fortescue was concerned with describing the 
constitutional principles that had been long established by the end of a dynasty, 
where “royal authority was placed upon a proper footing, and seen to rest upon 
the consent of the nation” and where “the Lancastrians always professed to 
rule as constitutional kings.”265 The main thrust of this text was to reaffirm that 
the English monarch was constrained by the laws. 
This text elaborated upon an argument Fortescue had made earlier in De 
Natura, which asserted that England’s government was a mixture of 
monarchial and republican principles.266 Fortescue concluded that only laws to 
which the people had given consent could be binding.267 Furthermore, the king 
only had freedom to act in a manner that was defined by the laws; his “absolute 
power,” or power to act directly without legal process, was confined to a 
carefully circumscribed set of customary areas, but these may only be 
exercised when they are not “contrary to law.”268 
His next treatise, De Laudibus Legum Angliae (hereinafter Laws), 
exercised great influence on the evolution of English jurisprudence. Fortescue, 
following Roman precedents, asserts that the powers of the king are derived 
from a grant of the people, a fact that establishes that he is subordinate to the 
laws, since they predated the monarchy and allowed for the creation of the 
monarchy.269 In his Laws, Fortescue asserts that a “king of England can not, at 
his pleasure, make any alterations in the laws of the land, for the nature of his 
government is not only regal, but political [i.e., not merely monarchial, but 
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republican].”270 He disavows the common misinterpretation of Ulpian (which 
he follows Bracton and Fleta in regarding as “the very principle of 
autocracy”)271 stating that while an absolute monarch could affirm this maxim, 
and English king cannot, as its laws: 
[A]re made by their [the peoples’] own consent and approbation [and they] 
enjoy their properties securely, and without the hazard of being deprived of 
them, either by the king or any other . . . . St. Thomas [Aquinas] . . . wishes . . . 
that the king might not be at liberty to tyrannize over his people; which only 
comes to pass in the present case; that is, when the sovereign power is 
restrained by political laws.272 
On the basis of this general theory, it is not surprising that Fortescue 
concluded, with respect to emergency powers in particular, that there is a 
“legal principle that no one may be put to death without trial.”273 
In his Governance, Fortescue presents a well-elaborated and particularly 
English variation of the early medieval argument that the king is bound to 
observe the normal ordo iudicarius because they are not merely positive laws, 
and adds to this a chilling predication of what would happen to the country if 
they consented to absolutism: 
Wherefore as often as such a king does anything against the law of God, or 
against the law of nature, he does wrong . . . . [A] king should do to his 
subjects what he would have done to himself, if he were a subject, which may 
not be that he would be almost destroyed, as are the commons of France.274 
This theme would prove very influential to English political thought, 
especially as differences emerged between the medieval constitutionalism 
retained in England and the novel theories of sovereignty that developed on the 
continent. 
V.  MEDIEVAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS TRANSFORMATION IN EARLY 
MODERN ERA FRANCE AND ENGLAND 
Fortescue and Francesco Accolti represent respectively the broad 
consensus of the common and civil law jurists at the end of the Middle Ages 
on the subject of the prince’s duty to obey the laws of due process under all 
circumstances. One can also observe how they developed arguments to counter 
the increasing absolutist claims being made by the rulers in this era who 
purported to have emergency powers or who merely attempted to rule on this 
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basis whenever they were strong enough to prevail against the guardians of the 
medieval constitutionalist order. 
During the first century of the early modern era, the rulers of what were 
rapidly becoming centralized states put severe pressures on the existing 
constitutional order found in both the common law and the ius commune. The 
legal restraints on medieval rulers were challenged during the crises brought 
about by the reformation, the dismemberment of the Holy Roman Empire, the 
emergency of what would become modern states, and the warfare and rebellion 
that erupted because of all of these developments. 
It is at this time that a clear divergence emerges—as foreshadowed by 
Fortescue—between the legal orders of England and France. This breach 
became a rupture after these two countries’ civil wars. In the wake of France’s 
civil war (usually called the French Wars of Religion), Henry IV was able to 
rapidly consolidate and expand his power, setting the stage for the creation of 
an absolute monarchy. The English Civil War took place forty years after the 
conclusion of its French equivalent; conversely it was won by those who 
resisted the Stuarts’s assumption of unconstitutional powers and drive towards 
absolute rule. The English constitutionalists who prevailed advocated the rule 
of law and the principle that a king had no emergency powers in a time of 
crisis, which was the opposite of the legal regime created in France. 
A. The Demise of French Constitutionalism and the Rise of Jean Bodin’s 
Ideas of the Undivided Sovereign Unbound by the Laws 
Until the decisive turn taken in 1572, the French kings could be considered 
constitutional monarchs.275 France’s “‘Renaissance monarchy’ was thus 
expected to respect established law and not to alter it without consent.”276 
However, due to the monarch’s greater degree of financial independence from 
the other branches of government than in most other kingly states, the French 
monarchy was able to govern between 1484 and 1560 without calling together 
the Estates-General.277 This is because, as Fortescue noted, the burden of 
regular taxation was much higher on the French people than that imposed on 
the English, where the King of England would frequently need to appeal to 
Parliament for emergency taxation during a crisis.278 
However, the French king’s fiscal independence from his subjects did not 
necessarily mean that he had a greater degree of control over these subjects 
than his English counterpart. Just as Coke had argued in Bonham’s Case, 
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French judges argued that the king had no power to invoke his emergency 
powers to draft rescripts that ignored the existing regulations of due process: 
[A]mong French jurists of the early sixteenth century there was a cautious but 
definite tendency to hold that plenitudo potestatis [the king’s absolute 
privilege] could not be legitimately invoked in derogation of a rule of law that 
the people had accepted and the ruler had confirmed . . . . 
. . . . 
  One consequence of this conception of the rule of law was the right of the 
courts to repudiate orders of the king in the ordinary course of doing justice. 
. . . The subjection of the king to law seemed so fundamental to the 
commentators that they often insisted upon it without the slightest of 
reservations.279 
In early sixteenth century French legal theory, one can see a clear echo of the 
Corpus iuris: the king is held to have regal power, but he is bound not to 
exercise it in a manner contrary to law. 
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, it was clear that the French state 
could no longer be governed in the old way. By 1572, there had been three 
distinct “wars of religion,” civil wars waged by the Catholic and Huguenot 
parties largely without the involvement of the monarch.280 That year, the 
monarchy intervened decisively, and in a manner that clearly indicated their 
abandonment of the principles of constitutional monarchy.281 After the 
attempted assassination of the Admiral de Coligny, Charles IX’s mother 
Catherine de’ Medici ordered the Swiss Guard to expel the remaining 
Huguenot leaders from the Palace of the Louvre and to kill them in the 
street.282 This was taken by the Catholic population of Paris as the green light 
for a pogrom.283 Thousands were killed in Paris and perhaps tens of thousands 
throughout the rest of the country, in what was later named the Saint 
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre.284 
On the fourth day of the killings, Charles issued a lit de justice, which 
granted amnesty to those who participated in the massacre, alleging that he had 
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authorized the first killings in order to preempt a conspiracy to assassinate his 
family.285 “In this fashion a weak and incompetent government finally decided 
upon a criminal solution to its difficulties.”286 In fact, within the paradigm of 
medieval constitutionalism, it was worse than criminal: it was tyrannical. 
There was a long line of jurisprudence stretching back to Aquinas that clearly 
justified the conclusion that Charles IX was no longer a king and could be 
justifiably overthrown. 
As this conclusion was unacceptable to the French Catholic polity, the 
massacre necessarily prefigured a transformation of ideas about sovereignty 
and indeed, ethics: 
[T]he doctrine of political murder . . . flourished during the sixteenth century 
when the principles of social morality and Christian politics elaborated by the 
theology of the Middle Ages, were replaced . . . [by] theories of a certain 
raison d’état according to which the end justified the means.”287 
However, these views also needed a legal justification, lest the Huguenots 
be able to present a persuasive justification for tyrannicide. This task fell 
largely to an obscure and heterodox jurist who had been influenced by 
humanist ideas in general and by Petrus Ramus in particular.288 
Jean Bodin’s early work touched upon the idea of sovereignty and clung 
largely to constitutionalist views,289 but four years after the Saint 
Bartholomew’s Day massacre, he published his Six Books of the 
Commonwealth, which created a new paradigm for both sovereign and 
executive power during emergencies.290 Bodin rejected the prevailing 
foundations on principle.291 This meant a rejection of the idea of sovereignty 
derived from the Corpus iuris, which had undergirded all Western public law 
for millennia. He also flatly rejected the idea of a mixed constitution, in which 
sovereignty was divided between various branches of government. Drawing 
upon partial and incomplete surveys of history, Bodin: 
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[A]ttempted to derive the contents of supreme authority [that which a king 
possesses] from the concept of supremacy itself . . . . He was always thinking 
of ‘the sovereign’ as one part of the society that rules the rest, according to the 
familial model of a kingship . . . a mixed constitution seemed a contradiction 
. . . . The fallacy in all of this is so transparent to the modern reader, and so 
profoundly foreign, that it is sometimes tempting to look for deeper lines of 
reasoning.292 
There is no deeper logic to Bodin’s essential argument about the 
indivisibility of sovereignty, which is the sole basis for his argument that the 
king of France is not bound by the laws. “The entire case is thus colored by a 
petitio principii [an argument that asks the listener to grant the conclusion in 
the guise of a premise]: Sovereign authority is absolute; The king of France is 
sovereign; [therefore] The king of France is absolute.”293 Bodin argues away 
all the evidence that kings are bound by laws, first by dispensing with all 
Roman law for allegedly being inadequate, and by arguing that coronation 
oaths (in which many European kings explicitly promised to be bound by the 
laws) are not supported by consideration.294 
“Bodin’s only justification of this odd result is drawn from practical 
necessity.”295 The Huguenots—adhering to medieval constitutionalism—were 
right in saying the king has exceeded his powers to the point of being no king 
at all, but rather a tyrant who may be lawfully resisted. The only solution is to 
reject their legal paradigm claim that the king cannot be bound by the laws, 
and when faced with an alleged emergency such as the rumored plot to murder 
Charles IX, he was not bound to put the conspirators on trial. Instead, he could 
simply condemn those subjects he accused of treason on his own authority. 
This theory served to legitimize a range of notorious abuses. In 1574, the 
Huguenot leader the Duke François of Montmorency was arrested and jailed in 
the Bastille on nothing more than Charles’s verbal orders, later affirmed by 
letters-patent.296 This action set the precedent for the lettres de cachet that 
authorized the indefinite detention of innumerable political prisoners.297 These 
orders, which sent the named person directly to prison without any contact 
whatsoever with the judicial system became ubiquitous: 
  The lettres de cachet, one of the most typical institutions of old French 
society, have been aptly called ‘the very essence of public life’ before the 
Revolution. Upon them rested the authority of king . . . . Although it is 
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commonly believed that the employment of lettres de cachet was largely 
confined to affairs of state, yet this is far from the truth.298 
Jacques Maritain notes “Jean Bodin is rightly considered the father of the 
modern theory of Sovereignty.”299 Maritain traced the development of the 
theory of absolute executive power from Bodin through Hobbes300—who also 
wrote during a civil war with a motivation similar to Bodin’s—and “versions 
of sovereignty evocative of Hobbes’s and Bodin’s have carried forth into the 
twentieth century.”301 The divergence between classical, continental, and 
Anglo-American approaches to emergency powers hinge on the acceptance or 
rejection of Bodin’s theses about the necessary features of a sovereign power. 
The next section will demonstrate that it was the reaction to this absolutism 
that led to the triumph of constitutionalist thought in England and to its 
transmission to America. 
A. The Rejection of Stuart Absolutism in Seventeenth Century England 
Seventeenth century England faced a crisis similar to that which had led to 
the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre after the dynastic transfer from the House 
of Tudor to the House of Stuart.302 Like the Bourbons, the Stuarts were 
outsiders;303 they hailed from a country with a monarchy that was much 
stronger than the one they came to govern.304 James had views on executive 
power that were clearly not compatible with the constitutionalism of the 
English bar. Before coming to the English throne, he had written a defense of 
quasi-absolutism entitled The True Law of Free Monarchies: “[T]he essence of 
a free monarchy was that royal power was limited by no human law.”305 
Unfortunately for James, the political conditions under which James I 
came to the throne were very different from those of Henry IV thirty years 
earlier. The existing constitutional restraints were much more formidable, 
thanks to the reaffirmation of “higher law” or “fundamental law” 
constitutionalism during the Elizabethan era.306 In the Jacobean era, common 
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lawyers still agreed with Fortescue that the executive prerogative was subject 
to legal definition and subordinate to the subject's legal liberties, such as the 
absolute rights to one's property and to the guarantees specified in the Magna 
Carta.307 
1. Constitutional and Absolutist Ideas of the Stuarts’ Royal Prerogative 
From the beginning of James’s reign, divergent views of the king's ability 
to define the scope of his own powers emerged. Three key court cases from 
early Stuart era illustrate the decline in relations between the Crown and the 
constitutionalist opposition in Parliament. These cases also demonstrate that 
the issue that was most fundamental to this conflict was the rule of law. Bates’s 
Case involves powers to regulate matters related to foreign affairs so as to 
serve (the king’s views of) the public interest;308 The Five Knights’ Case 
relates to the power to imprison citizens for reasons of state without formal 
charge;309 and the Case of the Ship Money is about the power of the purse after 
the king declares a public emergency.310 In the course of these lawsuits, one 
can observe the emergence of a robust theory of the rule of law at a crucial 
juncture in Anglo-American jurisprudence. One can also note that this was 
catalyzed by the rejection of Stuart arguments that the executive has the power 
to ignore the laws when it allegedly acts to protect the public welfare. 
a. Bates’s Case: James’s Absolute Prerogative to Protect the Common 
Good 
In the course of many attempts to raise funds, James often asserted that his 
powers were unlimited because of his duty to attend to matters of state and to 
protect the nation.311 He asserted further that he was the sole judge over 
whether any danger to the public existed, and resisted any attempts to force 
him to disclose his reasons or justify his conclusions.312 One pertinent early 
example of this argument can be found in the record of Bates’s Case (1606), 
where a merchant challenged the king’s power to raise the import duties, 
something which he argued belonged to Parliament alone since time 
immemorial.313 However, in a very controversial decision Chief Baron 
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Fleming ruled that the King possessed a plenary power to act for the welfare of 
all his subjects that was not restrained by the law.314 This prefigured many later 
arguments for broad emergency powers for the executive drawing upon the 
concept of necessity. Discussing Bates’s Case, Johann Sommerville (quoting 
Fleming) described its rationale as follows: 
‘The king's power is double, ordinary and absolute’ . . . . His ordinary power 
applied in cases where the public interest was not involved, and here the 
monarch was bound by the common law. . . . But in matters which concerned 
‘the general benefit of the people’ the king possessed an absolute power, 
subject only to the rules of ‘Policy and Government.’ The implications of these 
rules, said Fleming, were to be determined by ‘the wisdome of the king, for the 
common good’ and ‘all things done within these rules are lawful.’ If the king 
decided that something was in the public interest, it was not fit for subjects to 
question his judgment . . . .315 
Despite the looming implications of this interpretation of the executive 
prerogative when matters of state were invoked, following Bates’s Case, this 
action was legally unassailable: the king had merely to say that he was acting 
in the public interest to settle the issue, even when he was clearly abusing his 
power and damaging the common interest that he was sworn to protect. 
Unfortunately for James, the precedent provided by this case could not 
protect him from Parliament or their closest allies among the common-law 
judges, since they believed that the decision had ignored certain basic premises 
of the English constitution.316 More importantly, the constitutionalist 
opposition believed that this extraparliamentary taxation threatened to destroy 
the English constitution itself and would allow James to govern as an absolute 
monarch, since if he had ready access to revenue without needing to call 
Parliament, no laws could ever be passed to challenge or even censure his 
abuses.317 
b. Charles’s Alleged Prerogative to Imprison Dissidents for Reasons of 
State 
James’s successor, Charles I, inherited the same constitutional and 
financial dilemmas endemic to his father’s reign. As the Parliamentary 
opposition had feared, Charles suspended Parliament in order to prevent them 
from presenting a public complaint about the collection of taxes that they had 
not approved, something which they argued made “the hearts of your people 
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. . . full of fear of innovation and change of government.”318 Accordingly, 
Charles chose to pretend that these taxes were merely loans from his 
subjects.319 The “Forced Loan” fooled no one at the time, and arguments 
circulated that this specific practice had been banned by medieval statutes.320 
These arguments further stated that the king could not use his prerogative to 
ignore a statute and violate his subjects’ absolute right to their property.321 The 
resistance to this policy led to two historically significant confrontations 
between the king and Parliament on the issue of the scope of the prerogative. 
The first of these battles was waged over the passage of the Petition of 
Right, a statute that would later be seen as part of the fundamental laws of 
England, in which—like Magna Carta—Parliament held the king could not 
ignore the laws under any circumstances, including national emergencies.322 
“The Petition [of Right] acknowledged no emergency royal powers of taxation. 
The claim of necessity, in short, did not justify the king in flouting the law. It 
was, in any case, self-contradictory to infringe the liberties of the subject for 
the sake of promoting the public good.”323 
The Petition of Right also sought to take away the king's prerogative to 
imprison citizens without formal charge in exceptional cases.324 This practice 
had also been called into question during the Five Knights’ Case, which is 
known today as a precedent stating that habeas corpus may not be suspended 
by the executive branch.325 The petitioners had been arrested in 1627 under 
Charles’s orders for having resisted the forced loan.326 The matter was of 
paramount importance, as the king’s prerogative to temporarily imprison a 
subject on the basis of his emergency powers to protect the public had never 
before been challenged.327 While the case was decided on very narrow 
grounds, the case—and more importantly, its aftermath in Parliament—made it 
clear that the king’s allegedly absolute prerogative had some legal limits.328 
In the course of proceedings, Attorney General Sir Edward Heath argued 
that the king had both the power to issue commands that were defined by the 
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law of the land and an “absoluta potestas that the sovereign has. But when I 
call it [absolute power] I do not mean that it is such a power as that a king may 
do what he please, for he has rules to govern himself by.”329 However, royalist 
theorists argued that only the king himself could judge his own adherence to 
these rules.330 Following Fleming, they argued that no one else could challenge 
him when he argued that special circumstances existed that allowed him to use 
his absolute power in defense of the common good, or question whether he had 
done so within the appropriate limits set by the law of God.331 Unsurprisingly, 
the constitutionalists considered this argument unacceptable. 
Disputes over this argument for absolute emergency powers spilled over 
into the debates surrounding the drafting and passing of the Petition of Right. 
Constitutionalists complained that the king’s theory was precluded by the 
explicit terms of the Magna Carta;332 royalist theorists such as William 
Lambarde333 had earlier argued that while: 
[The] Magna Carta had re-established the rule of the common law in many 
areas . . . kings retained the old ‘absolute Authoritie’ in ‘a few rare and 
singular Cases’. . . . 
  . . . [Accordingly, the Member of Parliament Edward] Alford had warned 
the Commons that as long as ‘matters of state’ remained undefined the royal 
power was subject to abuse.334 
Charles resisted the passage of the Petition of Right, as he correctly 
predicted that his power to raise taxes without Parliament and to imprison 
those who resisted without showing any cause would prove vital to his survival 
in the years to come.335 Summarizing the arguments of his supporters, 
Sommerville notes the royalists’ argument that: 
[K]ings rule not only by the common law but by ‘a law of state’ . . . . ‘The 
common law,’ he said, ‘doth not provide for matters of state.’ Where such 
matters were at issue, the king was to govern by the law of state, and could ride 
roughshod over liberties guaranteed by the inferior and irrelevant common 
law. The king’s power of imprisoning without cause shown was ‘committed to 
him by God.’ Of course he could suppress the cause, for ‘every state hath 
secreta regni’ (secrets of the kingdom—i.e., state secrets).336 
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Owing to considerable financial pressures, Charles finally proved willing 
to sign the Petition of Right into law by the spring of 1628 if a caveat were to 
be added—namely, that the statute did not affect his sovereign power.337 
Parliament refused.338 Alford used the debate to both rebuke the king and to 
explicitly denounce the new concept of sovereignty as it had been articulated 
by Jean Bodin, which undergirded the royalist position.339 He asked, 
rhetorically: “What is sovereign power? Bodin says that it is free from any 
condition. By [agreeing to] this, we shall acknowledge a regal as well as a 
legal power.”340 Parliament, following Alford's advice, refused to acknowledge 
the existence of an extraordinary prerogative or indeed any absoluta 
potestas.341 For similar reasons, it rejected an amendment proposed by the 
House of Lords that would allow the king to imprison subjects for a limited 
time without showing cause “for reasons of state.”342 Coke noted that allowing 
this would amount to Parliament’s recognition of “an intrinsic prerogative . . . 
[that] no law can take . . . away.”343 
c. Hampden’s Case and the Rule of Law’s Applicability to Wartime 
Powers 
In 1635, Charles again resorted to extra-parliamentary taxation in order to 
raise funds.344 On the legal advice of his councilors, he attempted to disguise 
this taxation with various transparent fictions, so that his measures might 
pretend not to be unprecedented.345 The raising of “Ship Money” (as these 
levies were imposed in lieu of the obligation to furnish ships) was justified 
with the assertion that these funds were to be spent on coastal defense, 
although it was obvious that they would instead be used to pay Charles’s 
debts.346 Despite Charles’s dubious assertions, there had been no general 
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resistance to the imposition of Ship Money in 1634.347 This is likely because 
there had been some recent precedents for raising Ship Money in times of 
peril.348 However, in 1635 Charles made the mistake of attempting to raise 
Ship Money in inland counties further from the maritime communities, which 
had never been previously subjected to the imposition.349 Charles gave only his 
implicit promise that it would fund the Navy, but he insisted that he had no 
duty to answer any questions from his subjects about whether or not it had 
actually been spent on maritime defense.350 
John Hampden’s refusal to pay set the stage for the last great confrontation 
between the king and the constitutionalist opposition before the Civil War. In 
Sir David Keir's words, “[T]he point before the Court . . . was the same that 
had already been decided in Bates’s Case and Darnel’s [the Five Knights’] 
Case . . . . The problem was to determine the King's discretionary power to act 
for the public good.”351 Oliver St. John argued for Hampden that if the king 
alone was the judge of whether an emergency existed and also the sole judge 
of the scope of his prerogative, then no English subject had any property 
rights.352 This of course was a summary of the primary complaint found in the 
Petition of Right, which had asserted that this absolutist principle was not 
consistent with the “fundamental propriety in his goods and a fundamental 
liberty of his person,” rights which the constitutionalists argued that king was 
bound by the law to respect, even during emergencies.353 
Summarizing and quoting the King’s Counsel’s response, Keir describes it 
in the following terms: 
[The king] is an absolute monarch. . . . ‘As he is an absolute monarch, so all 
these iura summae magistatis [powers of the supreme majesty] are given unto 
his person by the common law.’ . . . His bona fides must be presumed. . . . 
Parliament must not even inquire into whether the King has used his ordinary 
revenue for the purpose. It is improper to scrutinize his expenditure.354 
Sir Edward Crawley (another barrister for the king) “quoted Commines and 
[Jean] Bodin in support of the king's right to levy money . . . remarking that 
these ‘wrote not according to the law of any one kingdom, but according to the 
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law of reason,’”355 asserting that necessity, as assessed by the king, was always 
superior to the law of the land. 
Gough noted that Sir Robert Berkeley’s judgment conceded the existence 
of “fundamental policy, and maxims, and rules of law for the government of 
the realm,” that barred extra-parliamentary taxation, but: 
  [The idea] that this ‘fundamental policy in the creation of the frame of this 
kingdom’ meant that the king could be restrained if he tried to raise money 
except through parliament, he was ‘utterly mistaken herein’. . . . 
  Berkeley described the arguments of Hampden's counsel, in often-quoted 
words, as ‘a king-yoking policy’, and declared [quoting one of King James I's 
most provocative assertions of absolute power] that he ‘never heard that lex 
was rex [that law was king] but rather the reverse, for the King was lex 
loquens, a living, a speaking, an acting law’.356 
This theory of the king’s prerogative prevailed in this case with a narrow 
majority,357 despite the fact that it reversed centuries of precedent from 
Bracton to Fortescue and beyond. The ruling depended on the argument from 
necessity: “In a case of necessity, [Justice Berkeley] said, the king had ‘regal 
power’ to make extra-parliamentary levies,”358 and held that he alone was the 
judge of the necessity, rejecting Littleton’s arguments that these emergencies 
should be brought to Parliament’s attention.359 This judgment was an extension 
of the logic of Baron Fleming’s decision in Bates’s Case.360 
What was different about this decision was that it explicitly ignored an 
intervening statute—the Petition of Right—that Parliament had passed in order 
to prevent the king from taking precisely these sorts of actions.361 Following 
Berkeley’s reasoning, Parliament could never bind the king, since he could 
operate above the statutes whenever he declared an emergency, even in 
peacetime. On this logic, he was not even bound by the Magna Carta, which 
had been repeatedly reaffirmed by successive monarchs in exchange for grants 
of taxes and other impositions.362 The court had thus declared England to be 
closer to an absolute monarchy—not only in practice, but also in theory—than 
at any time since the reign of Edward II. 
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It would not be long until the backlash against absolutism and the 
accompanying reckoning. The judges who had concurred in Berkeley’s 
judgment were impeached in 1641.363 Soon thereafter Charles himself was 
executed for treason to the realm, after being convicted for violating his 
coronation oath to rule in accordance with the law of the land.364 In a direct 
rebuke to the opinions detailed above, the prosecutor at Charles’s trial asserted 
that “it is one of the fundamentals of law, [t]hat the king is not above the law, 
but the law above the king.”365 The maximalist interpretation of salus populi 
suprema lex est has only ever been advanced openly by one English monarch 
(Charles I), and this led directly to his execution.366 Later attempts to revive 
this maxim in a more limited form only led to the destruction of his dynasty 
and its replacement by the House of Hanover.367 More importantly, one can see 
that the maxim was decisively rejected within the Anglo-American 
constitutional tradition because of its absolutist implications. 
VI.  THE MAXIMS OF EARLY MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN TREATISES 
The question that remains is this: if the principle that salus populi suprema 
lex est was repeatedly and decisively rejected within Anglo-American law, 
why does it seem to have some weight within modern American legal 
discourse? It will be demonstrated in this Part that the maxim was given some 
attention in the early modern era, but only with a carefully circumscribed 
meaning that is rather different from that assigned by Gross and Paulsen. One 
must first consider the status of a maxim within English law. 
A. Sir Francis Bacon and the Idea of the Maxims of the Common Law 
Maxims are defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as: “A traditional legal 
principle that has been frozen into a concise expression. Examples are 
‘possession is nine-tenths of the law’ and caveat emptor (‘let the buyer 
beware’). Also termed legal maxim.”368 They are considered legal principles 
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only in the loosest sense of that word, since they are not sources of law in and 
of themselves, but only paraphrases of general principles, which do not define 
the scope of their own application. 
This modern understanding of the legal force of a maxim is in line with the 
traditional view of English common lawyers. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen 
observed, “It seems to me that legal maxims in general are little more than pert 
headings of chapters. They are rather minims than maxims . . . . As often as 
not, the exceptions and qualifications to them are more important than the so-
called rules.”369 However, civilian jurists had a much higher opinion of 
maxims, since in the Corpus Iuris they had binding legal force; they were 
regulae juris.370 Not coincidentally, the first collection of the ‘maxims’ of 
English law371 involves an attempt to create entirely new sources of English 
law that would align it with the civil law, and which would displace existing 
precedent. This task was undertaken by Sir Francis Bacon, who was heavily 
invested in the attempt to reframe the laws of England so as to make them 
much more accommodating to James’s authoritarian impulses.372 
James’s first attempt to recast English law came couched within a proposal 
for the union of the realms of Scotland and England.373 This realignment would 
surely have been advantageous to the crown, as Scotland was (and is) a civil 
law jurisdiction, where the king was not bound by such fundamental laws as 
the Magna Carta and the six due process statutes of Edward III, but merely by 
Digna Vox.374 Bacon had already been advocating a codification of English 
law, and “following the example of the great law reformers Justinian and 
Edward I [authoritarians both]” he “repeatedly urged the role of Solomonic 
lawgiver on both Elizabeth and James.”375 Bacon used the proposal for the 
union of the realms to advocate for codification of English common law.376 
After this failed, Bacon proposed a codification of the penal laws of the realm, 
something he again recommended to the King in 1614.377 
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In 1621, Bacon presented the results of a five-year effort to “recompile” 
the law of England and strike down over 600 statutes.378 Unfortunately for 
Bacon’s proposal, this was also the year in which he fell from grace. At his 
impeachment, Bacon plead guilty to charges of bribery, confessing in response 
to every charge “that I am guilty of corruption.”379 His official influence 
having come to an end, Bacon attempted to build broader support for his 
reform efforts informally, by circulating three preparatory texts.380 
Each of these texts was distributed in inverse proportion to its frankness. 
Early in his career, Bacon had written A Collection of Some Principal Rules 
and Maxims of the Common Laws.381 Note that he was already identifying the 
maxims not as paraphrases of general principles (as was customary at common 
law, and as found in the work of Bracton and Fortescue),382 but rather with 
binding regula iuris, as did the civilian jurists.383 When he was at the height of 
his power and codification seemed an attainable goal, he wrote the Example of 
a Treatise on Universal Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms and 
finally the Aphorisms on the Greater Law of Nations, or the Fountains of 
Justice and Law.384 
The first text was in English, the better for the wide audience Bacon hoped 
to receive.385 Curiously, the maxims themselves are in untranslated Latin.386 
Bacon noted in his preface that he chose Latin since it was “of the greatest 
authority and majesty to be avouched and alledged [sic] in argument.”387 He 
was attempting to invest them with “a kind of mysterious halo” that frequently 
“has had . . . the effect of preventing proper inquiry into their meaning.”388 
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Bacon seems to have considered this an implicit argument for the conclusion 
that his maxims should have the force of the civil law’s regulae. 
In this Elizabethan work, there is very little mention of salus populi. 
However, he slips the maxim into his discussion of Regula XII.389 This twelfth 
maxim (which Bacon creates by synthesizing a set of rather diverse 
precedents) is receditur à placitis juris, potius quam injuriae et delicta 
maneant impunita (pleas of law shall be receded from, so that crimes and 
injuries shall not go unpunished).390 Here, Bacon turns his endeavor entirely on 
its head, stating that in this case, those principles to which the maxim refers do 
not deserve the status of regulae at all, but merely a placita juris (pleas of law, 
being grounds of learning rather than binding rules).391 Bacon is forced to 
admit that it is a “rule” that “penal statutes shall not be taken by [construed 
with principles appropriate to]392 equity.”393 However, he clearly wishes that 
this were not the case, as he argues that it is better that the law dispense with 
principles that protect the accused “rather than crimes . . . [go] unpunished,” as 
“quia salus populi suprema lex; and salus populi is contained in repressing 
offences by punishment.”394 
Another more tangential discussion of the salus populi in this text comes in 
his explanation of the maxim necessitas inducit privilegium quoad [sic] iura 
privata (necessity induces a privilege because of a private right). This 
principle, still extant in the common law, establishes such rights as that of a 
ship’s master to tie his ship to a private dock when it would otherwise be 
destroyed (subject to the dock owner’s right of compensation should the dock 
be damaged thereby).395 Bacon then takes this principle and twists it further 
than it can bear, without any citation of authority. He argues that the right 
created by private necessity does not run against the state.396 With no statute or 
case to rely upon, Bacon states, “[T]he law impose[s] [the duty] upon every 
subject, that he prefer the urgent service of his prince and country before the 
safety of his life.”397 However, his Maxims make no attempt to define the 
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powers of the king towards his subjects, since discussion of the scope of the 
privilege was assiduously avoided during Elizabeth’s reign.398 
When this subject exploded to the forefront of legal discourse in the wake 
of Bates’s Case and the Five Knight’s Case, Bacon had much to say about his 
patron’s powers, although he took precautions against his words being fully 
understood by his enemies. Both the Aphorisms on Universal Justice and the 
Aphorisms on the Law of Nations were written entirely in Latin, a language 
that many lawyers of that time could not have read without difficulty.399 In 
Aphorisms on the Greater Law of Nations, his approach was more ambitious: 
The Maximes considered only the first level of law . . . . The Aphorismi went 
beyond this level to look at first principles: the origins of law, how and why 
law grew over time, and what authority meant and how it legitimated law. 
Certain of the aphorisms Bacon set down are clearly the work of a man who 
had read Machiavelli and who would serve as the mentor of a young Thomas 
Hobbes.400 
His analysis in these works was wholly consistent with the absolutist 
theory of the function of law and its position that the constitutional order must 
enable the executive to act when necessary to protect the state, as elaborated by 
James I, and later Thomas Hobbes. However, it is not compatible with the 
constitutional settlement of the English Civil War and the delimiting of 
executive powers after the Glorious Revolution, in which English jurists 
explicitly rejected James and Hobbes’s ideas of sovereignty. 
In the Aphorisms on Universal Justice, Bacon argues that private rights are 
subordinate to the rights of the sovereign, since “[p]rivate right depends upon 
the protection of public right. For the law protects the people, and magistrates 
protect the laws; but the authority of the magistrates depends upon the 
sovereign power of the government [not, as in medieval constitutionalism, on 
the natural law].”401 This passage betrays Bodin’s influence, his Six Books 
having been published in English fifteen years earlier.402 In particular, it is 
possible to detect how in this later work Bacon rejects both the rule of law and 
his earlier acknowledgement that penal statues must be strictly construed: 
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Fresh cases [involving alleged wrongs that are not recognized as crimes at 
common law or by statute] happen in criminal causes which require 
punishment . . . . 
  Let the Censorian Courts have power and jurisdiction, not only to punish 
new offences, but also to increase the punishments appointed by law [i.e., by 
statute] for old ones . . . . For an enormous crime has somewhat of the nature 
of a new one.403 
To understand what Bacon means by “Censorian Courts,” which are 
undefined in this text, one must turn to Bacon’s History of the Reign of King 
Henry VII, where he argues that the “Star-chamber had the Censorian 
power,”404 and therefore was a sort of court of criminal equity,405 which could 
severely punish wrongs that were not crimes, despite the fact that the 
jurisdiction of the Star Chamber had been carefully defined by statute, and 
both Parliament and the Justices had repeatedly rejected attempts to expand 
that jurisdiction.406 Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that as “Bacon 
sought to regularize English law” by way of “a kind of codification,”407 his 
“New Digest of the Law” would have contained a theory of sovereignty that 
granted the Stuart monarchs the same powers as the kings of France. 
Finally, in his Aphorisms on the Law of Nations, Bacon indicated how he 
hoped emergency powers could justify the introduction of absolute royal 
power into English law: 
[I]t must be noted that legal bonds do not prevail in all cases. . . . If the power 
of any subject is so great that when he commits a crime he is safe from 
prosecution, then a king, who puts this subject to death without a legal 
proceeding, does not break the law. . . . [For] the safety of a private person is 
owed to the state, particularly in times of danger.408 
Here, Bacon repeats the exact legal theory that Henry VII had invoked in 
his dispute against Robert of Naples, which had been decisively rejected for 
running contrary to medieval jurisprudence, which then served as the base for 
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medieval constitutionalism.409 This decretal had established that exigent 
circumstances could never excuse the king from the requirement that a subject 
be given an opportunity to defend themselves at law.410 To justify his own 
view, Bacon rejects constitutionalism (and foreshadows the work of his 
admirer Hobbes), writing that since laws change, “It follows necessarily that 
there is in any commonwealth a certain power above the laws, that can abolish 
them and make them anew . . . . [T]he authority of laws does not depend upon 
consent alone, but wholly upon ruling authority [imperium].”411 
Bacon’s conception of imperium (and of Roman law generally) is 
fundamentally flawed. Betraying ignorance of all the medieval commentary on 
Digna Vox and the differences between Byzantine and Roman theories of 
imperium, he states that: 
[I]n the Imperial Roman law . . . there was the opinion . . . that for any law 
either proposed or already submitted, the people had already transferred their 
universal power to the Emperor. . . . [O]nce the supreme power has 
transformed itself, [i.e., it has been given by the people to the sovereign] it 
cannot be restored to its former state.412 
As both a matter of law and of history, this assertion is incorrect. 
“In law by his concept of the legal maxim [Bacon] hoped to stand higher 
than Coke in the eyes of posterity and by his digests of case and statute law to 
emulate on English soil the innovations of Justinian.”413 However, “if Bacon 
wanted to be an English Trebonianus, James . . . could not be an English 
Justinian,”414 owing to the fierce resistance of the common lawyers, namely the 
opposition in Parliament of Whitelocke, St. John, Coke, and Alford. Bacon 
wrote, “I am in good hope, that when Sir Edward Coke’s Reports and my 
Rules and Decisions shall come to posterity, there will be (whatsoever is now 
thought) question who was the greater lawyer.”415 The answer of posterity is 
obvious. Following his impeachment in 1621 and the abolition of his beloved 
Star Chamber in 1641,416 Bacon’s legal work became a historical footnote. 
Coke, who told James that he could not sit in judgment personally, who in 
judgment held that the judiciary had the power to strike down unconstitutional 
proclamations, and who authored the Petition of Right (which specified that 
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the king had no emergency powers to ignore the laws) became a hero to 
generations of constitutionalists, including the Framers. 
B. Maxims of the Common Law Related to Salus Populi After Bacon 
Bacon’s legal work was ignored by posterity, with one exception. His 
Elizabethan Maxims, owing perhaps to their moderation, became an inspiration 
to treatise-writers, who emulated his example in producing collections of legal 
principles. These followers, as this section will demonstrate, were much more 
modest, noting that they needed to rely on precedent, and in general refrain 
from synthesizing what were purportedly new rules. In these treatises the 
strong interpretation of salus populi given by Bacon (and Paulsen and Gross) 
had been rejected by eighteenth-century Anglo-American legal thought. 
The first jurists to follow Bacon’s example and produce a book of maxims 
was William Noy. His The Principal Grounds and Maxims with Analysis of the 
Laws of England is also an implicit rebuttal to some of Bacon’s assertions.417 
Indeed, wherever he departs from Bacon, one can discern some clear intent to 
make a point, since he otherwise follows Bacon very closely. Noy made no 
attempt to cast his maxims as rules or regulae but merely “grounds” (what 
Bacon called placitis).418 
Noy also makes no direct mention of the salus populi, which seems solid 
evidence that it was not a recognized concept within common law thought at 
the time. He comes to this maxim when illustrating the principle that “[t]he law 
favours things for the good of the commonwealth,”419 but he makes no stronger 
case for executive power than saying that “if a sheriff pursue a felon to a 
house, and to apprehend the felon, he breaks open the door of a house, he may 
justify it.”420 He does not even imply that the king has any power to act against 
the laws or otherwise take advantage of his subjects in emergencies, except 
perhaps for the perennial example of allowing a house to be knocked down to 
prevent the spread of a conflagration. In the manner befitting a common 
lawyer, Noy does not attempt to derive a general principle from this custom, 
and instead notes cautiously that the citizen’s house must already be 
“burning.”421 
Noy’s discussion of the maxims related to the doctrine of necessity also 
provides a counterpoint to Bacon. He cleaves closely to Bacon’s discussion of 
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private necessity,422 but he adds one gloss not found in the Maxims. Citing the 
reports of that great constitutionalist justice Edmund Plowden, he notes that the 
king’s power to act out of necessity was limited by a statute that had become 
part of the fundamental laws of England: “[B]efore the statute of Magna 
Charta, the King might enter into another’s woods, and cut the trees for 
reparations of castles.”423 Here, Noy impliedly asserts that the king cannot act 
out of necessity in a way that has been foreclosed by the law. This is a 
rejection of the broader interpretations of the doctrine salus populi suprema lex 
est, as here it is the Great Charter that is the supreme law, such that it prevails 
over even the principles of public necessity. 
The third major compilation of maxims of the early modern era was 
written by an anonymous “Gentleman of Middle Temple” in 1751.424 For the 
first time, salus populi suprema lex est is listed as a separate maxim in its own 
right.425 Several precedents formerly listed (in Noy and Bacon) under the 
headings of the maxims related to necessity are found in this section, which 
details the right to “raze houses in publico incendio” and to erect “bulwarks 
upon another’s land” or to “[turn] the plough upon the head-land of 
another.”426 These precedents all create defenses for members of the public and 
confer no rights upon the government.427 
The Gentleman makes no mention of any right of the king to act 
unilaterally to safeguard the security of the state or its population in his 
discussions of the maxims related to private necessity.428 He also omits 
Bacon’s principle that necessity is not a defense against the crown.429 Lastly, in 
his discussion of the rule that penal statutes are not to be construed by equity, 
he makes a stronger case in more general language. The maxim here is phrased 
“statutes penal to be construed strictly,” turning a negative statement into a 
stronger positive proscription.430 This rejects the argument for investing any 
court with the Censorian authority, as Bacon had argued the Star Chamber 
possessed in his Aphorisms. The Gentleman’s statement of the rule also 
contains no exceptions.431 
It should be noted that this particular book of maxims was frequently 
found in the libraries of colonial lawyers during the revolutionary period 
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(1761–1783) and in the libraries of the Framers during that time.432 
Accordingly, it is now evident that the idea that the executive should have 
broad powers to protect the public welfare during an emergency—if indeed it 
was known to the Framers—did not come from the maxims or principles of the 
common law at the time, just as it could not have come from Cicero, from the 
history of Roman or medieval constitutionalism, and certainly not from their 
heroes amongst the Parliamentarian opposition to the Stuarts in the seventeenth 
century. However, since this maxim is frequently traced to John Locke, one 
must consider whether his words comprise support for the interpretation given 
to it by Paulsen and Gross. 
VII.  JOHN LOCKE, THE MAXIM, AND THE HOBBESIAN EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 
It is indisputable that John Locke influenced the Framers, and it is likewise 
impossible to deny that on the title page of the Two Treatises of Government, 
the phrase “salus populi suprema lex est” is found directly beneath the author’s 
name.433 Locke, in the section of his treatise which comes directly before his 
discussion of executive privilege, made use of the maxim, saying: “Salus 
populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that he, who 
sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err.”434 Accordingly, a case might be 
made that at the time of the framing the view that the executive should have 
the power to transcend the constitution in a time of crisis was part of the 
consensus, owing to Locke’s views on government. However, it will be 
evident after a detailed review of the Two Treatises that Locke did not in fact 
advocate this view, and accordingly that he cannot be a source for these views 
at the time of the American Revolution. 
A. The Misrepresentation of Locke’s Views on Executive Privilege 
Locke’s views on executive power have lately been mischaracterized.435 
While it has long been the conventional wisdom to ascribe views to Locke that 
were largely in conformity with his whig and puritan contemporaries, this view 
was jettisoned in the twentieth century, and “Locke has thus been made out to 
be very like Hobbes.”436 This revisionism can be ascribed largely to the 
neoconservative theorist Leo Strauss437 and his pupil Richard H. Cox: 
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  It is largely Locke’s partnership with Hobbes in promoting this alleged 
drastic deterioration of the European natural-law tradition which Leo Strauss 
has been concerned to expose in his treatment of Locke, and a former pupil of 
his, Richard H. Cox, has analysed exhaustively . . . in the Two Treatises.438 
Their influential account of Locke, which posits that his vision of 
executive power constitutes a clear break with earlier constitutionalist views 
was subjected to Dunn’s criticism: 
The argument ex silentio . . . is deployed on the basis of a crude and question-
begging biographical hypothesis and in a fashion which repeatedly ignores the 
characters of the texts analysed. . . . 
  . . . . 
  There are two major points at which Cox misrepresents Locke’s position. 
The first is his assertion of primacy of right over duty and the second is the 
meaning he gives to the primacy of security over consumption. . . . 
  . . . [I]t is not a defensible analysis of Locke’s work to turn it in this 
fashion into an apology for the machtstaat.439 
J. W. Gough also responded negatively to the revisionist view that equated 
Locke and Hobbes’s ideas: 
  So paradoxical a conclusion should surely make the critics pause. 
Admittedly one can find resemblances between the political doctrines of 
Hobbes and Locke, but it is not difficult to think of wide areas of divergence: 
for example, Hobbes’s sovereign [like Bodin’s] is not only undivided but 
indivisible, whereas Locke separates executive and legislative, and rejects 
“arbitrary” personal power. . . . Locke himself . . . spoke of Hobbes and 
Spinoza as “justly decried names.” . . . . He wrote to . . . refute Filmer’s 
patriarchal version of the divine right of kings. . . . Filmer and Hobbes held 
similar views about law and sovereignty, so that rejection of the one involved 
rejection of the other also.440 
Gough explained that the key to understanding Locke is to understand his 
influences, which are precisely those influences that Hobbes rejected: 
[H]e was the inheritor from the middle ages of an ancient tradition which had 
come down, continually being modified in the process, from . . . the Roman 
jurists. Locke inherited this tradition . . . partly perhaps from other English 
writers . . . who had used the concept of the law of nature in a reply to 
Hobbes.441 
Accordingly, to discern the meaning of the salus populi quotation from 
The Two Treatises, one must first understand that Locke believed that the 
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executive is normally bound to observe the laws. However, Locke noted that 
the duties of the executive flow from two sorts of obligations.442 One is 
contractual, while the second comes from the law of trusts.443 The first of these 
is a conventional idea drawn from medieval constitutionalism, while the 
second is more innovative.444 Pursuant to this second source of duties, Locke 
held that the legislature and the executive are given a power akin to that of a 
trustee over the public welfare, insofar as they are not bound to perform 
particular actions, but rather to attempt to achieve certain ends and to prioritize 
the well-being of the beneficiaries.445 
Locke also believed that the executive power needs prerogative powers 
because they are entrusted with the duty to preserve the state. While he 
concluded that the executive may exercise its prerogative “against the direct 
letter of the law,”446 it could only ignore those positive laws of the state that do 
not establish or shape the fiduciary relationship between the executive and the 
citizenry. For Locke, the creation of the trust that created the prerogative 
powers flowed from the specific promises of the executive to govern in 
accordance with the constitutional order.447 The key difference between 
Locke’s view and Hobbes’s is Locke’s view of the function of these promises: 
“[P]romises . . . even bind the Almighty. . . . [T]his stress on the status of 
promises is one of the taboos which the exponents of raison d’état [Bodin, 
Hobbes] regarded with the greatest contempt, as the merest superstition.”448 
Dunn asks and answers the vital question about Locke’s invocation of the 
maxim: 
What then are we to make of Locke himself when he says that whoever 
sincerely follows the Rule Salus Populi Suprema Lex ‘cannot dangerously err’ 
. . . ? One possibility is to point severely to the context in which he uses this 
particular expression . . . [and] insist that it does not involve any breach of a 
promise or oath . . . . [and note] that if Locke wished to exempt princes from 
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their obligations he would be in the odd position of supposing Charles II (or, 
later, William III) not to be bound by a practice which bound God himself.449 
It is obvious that Locke—unlike such theorists as Gabriel Naudé, who 
followed Bodin and “used the salus populi axiom to justify virtually any sort of 
evil in order that public good might come of it,”450—had a more modest idea in 
mind. Like Cicero, he hoped that the trustee of the public welfare would 
consider the health of the people as their foremost guiding principle. There is 
no support for the conclusion that he intended that the maxim should justify the 
executive’s breaking their promises and disregarding the constitution. This 
would have required a theory of undivided and unbounded sovereignty, while 
Locke had written Two Treatises precisely to rebut this theory —as espoused 
by Filmer, and later, Hobbes.451 
B. The Framers’ Rejection of Hobbes 
If Thomas Hobbes was a key influence on the Framers, then it is possible 
that a much more robust vision of executive power and a strong version of the 
maxim of salus populi might have been contemplated by the founding fathers. 
However, since there is ample evidence that Hobbes’s view on these subjects is 
entirely inconsistent with Locke’s, it is unlikely that this is the case. Even those 
who advocate this theory admit that “[t]he most generous view of Hobbes’s 
influence is that the Founders generally accepted his view of the problem of 
politics while rejecting his solution.”452 Hobbes (the so-called “monster of 
Malmsbury”453) was seen by the entire founding generation as an opponent of 
freedom. This opinion was shared by both patriots and loyalists: 
Writers the colonists took to be opponents of Enlightenment rationalism—
primarily Hobbes, Filmer, Sibthorpe, Mandeville, and Mainwaring—were 
denounced as frequently by loyalists as by patriots . . . . [W]ith the exception 
of Filmer none of the authors . . . were in fact referred to favorably by 
Tories.454 
Hobbes was also denounced and rejected by one of the key legal theorists 
of the previous century, one who was held in high esteem by the Framers, Sir 
Matthew Hale, who authored several influential treatises. His History and 
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Analysis of the Common Law of England455 was a mainstay of the 
constitutionalist tradition. For the purposes of this Article, however, another 
work of Hale’s is particularly pertinent: his Reflections on Hobbes’s Dialogue 
of the Laws,456 which illustrates the vast gulf between the constitutionalist 
tradition that influenced the Framers and the theory of sovereignty that they 
rejected. 
Hobbes’s dialogue had been a strenuous criticism of Coke; following 
Bodin, he argued that “Law . . . is the command of a sovereign which, though 
it may be iniquitous, cannot be unjust. Neither case law, nor custom, is truly 
law.”457 Hobbes believed that the sovereign’s power knew no bounds: “[T]hese 
laws cannot bind him, since otherwise he would lose his supreme power to 
keep order.”458 Like his royalist antecedents, he claimed that the subjects of the 
sovereign cede to it all of their natural rights, as condition of the protection that 
the sovereign provides from the potential war of all against all; in order to 
provide this protection, the sovereign had a right to demand undivided and 
unlimited authority.459 As Hale summarized Hobbes’s views: “[T]here can be 
no qualifications or modification of the power of a sovereign prince . . . . [H]e 
alone is judge of all public dangers and may appoint such remedies as he 
please and impose what charges he thinks fit in order thereunto.”460 
Conversely, Hale championed the traditional view461—the constitution 
may “in many cases hinder the kings acts and make them void if they are 
against law.”462 It is not surprising that Hale would be unsympathetic to 
Hobbes’s views, since constitutionalism imposes limitations “on the 
sovereignty of the lawmaking power.”463 This is a natural consequence of the 
fact that the constitutionalist lawyers had “emphasized the ancient tradition of 
limitations upon the royal prerogative.”464 
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Hale “countered Hobbes’ ideal type not with only moral and political 
arguments but also with the reality of English constitutional history, to which 
he attached normative significance,”465 pointing in particular to the boundaries 
on the powers of the executive, which he argued were desirable.466 He noted 
that the king was bound by his coronation oath to observe the nation’s 
fundamental laws, and that those laws, as named in such acts as the Magna 
Carta, particularly mentioned the liberties of the subject.467 In doing so, he 
argued that “the sovereignty of the king exists within a legal framework.”468 
Drawing on a tradition that extends as far back as Bracton, he asserted that the 
king is not above the law, but is constrained by those very laws that give him 
legitimacy.469 
Hale’s response attests to the essential continuity of English legal 
thought,470 reviving the argument that: 
[Owing to] the great solemnity of the oath which he takes at his coronation to 
observe and keep those laws and liberties . . . no man can make a question 
whether [the king] be not in the sight of God and by the bond of natural justice 
be obliged to keep it.471 
Furthermore, he answered Hobbes’ argument that the sovereign required 
unlimited powers to protect the public in unforeseen emergencies by saying: 
[I]t is a madness to think that the model of laws of government is to be framed 
according to such circumstances as very rarely occur. It is as if a man should 
make agaric and rhubarb his ordinary diet, because it is of use when he is sick, 
which may be once in seven years.472 
Finally, when addressing the question of the Framers’ vision of executive 
power, one must remember that one of the key objections the patriot party had 
with existing British constitutional theory was its turn to a theory of 
sovereignty that drew heavily upon continental theory,473 much to the chagrin 
of their colonial subjects, who cleaved to the theory of the ancient constitution 
and the fundamental law tradition.474 The American patriots believed that 
“Parliament had adopted wholeheartedly the doctrine of sovereignty as stated 
by Hobbes, that in every state there must be a sovereign, uncontrolled by law 
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. . . a theory of law that had cost Charles I his head and James II his throne,”475 
as the English Parliament had adopted the theory of sovereignty that “emerged 
with the writings of Thomas Hobbes . . . departing from the common law 
tradition and from the constitutionalism that would dominate American legal 
thought both before the Revolution and into the age of the early republic.”476 
Accordingly, the burden of proof is squarely on those who assert that the 
Framers had adopted a view of sovereignty that was Hobbesian and 
fundamentally antithetical to Hobbes’s.477 This is what Paulsen has argued, 
against the great weight of all of the historical evidence adduced above. He has 
not met his obligation to refute, or indeed even address this argument. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated that it is certainly not the case that the 
preservation of a constitutional order requires the state to vest the executive 
with the power to ignore its constitution. No other previously existing 
constitutional state had done so, and they frequently rejected rulers’ attempts to 
create the constitutional metaprinciple that Paulsen prizes. 
Since the Roman Republic, states with mixed constitutions have invariably 
limited the emergency powers of their executives, since the abuse of this 
privilege has been rightly regarded as more dangerous to the constitution than 
any external threat. Following Polybius’s conception of the cycle of 
constitutions, the theorists of antiquity noted that a ruler “will ask for 
extraordinary powers to cope with . . . violent opposition. Once he has obtained 
these powers, together with command over an armed force that obeys him 
blindly, he becomes a tyrant.”478 While Cicero had pressed very hard for such 
extraordinary powers, he was repeatedly rebuked for doing so and ultimately 
sent into exile. Having learned his lesson about the unacceptability of these 
proposals, he abandoned them in the comprehensive program for the reform of 
the republican constitution found in his The Laws. 
Cicero’s conviction drove home the principle that—even after passage of 
the senatus consultum ultimum—Consuls were required to observe certain 
constitutional norms. These precluded such actions as Rabirius’s murder of 
Saturninus and the Senate’s execution of Lentulus. Even in emergencies, the 
executive was required to observe the laws that provided the accused with due 
process and the right of appeal. In the imperial period, the executive was still 
bound to observe these laws. While Trebonian and Justinian distorted Ulpian’s 
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jurisprudence to give the Byzantine emperors more powers, they were still held 
to be morally bound to observe the laws by Digna Vox. 
Medieval constitutionalism shows how this Roman theory of mixed 
government and limited powers was rediscovered and pressed into service as 
the cornerstone of early European theories of regal power. Legalistic 
interpretations of Digna Vox created powerful limits on a king’s ability to 
deviate from the ordo iudicarius when they contended that civil emergencies 
demanded that the defendant receive less than due process would otherwise 
require. The Magna Carta and the Saepe Contingit established that kings did 
not have a constitutional power to dispense with the laws in emergencies (in 
countries governed by the common law and the ius commune, respectively). 
Jean Bodin’s theory of undivided and unlimited sovereignty was a radical 
break with existing legal theory. It was adopted in France in order to justify 
Charles IX’s blatant criminality in the wake of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day 
massacre. However, when the Stuarts attempted to transplant this theory of 
strong executive power into England, the legal profession led the successful 
resistance to this drive towards absolutism. The early Stuart monarchs 
attempted to justify an unbounded executive privilege by arguing that they 
could ignore the laws when protecting the country in a time of emergency. The 
incompatibility between this assertion and medieval constitutionalism was 
exposed in three key cases, which led to a backlash against strong executive 
powers in general and broad emergency powers in particular. 
The jurists who decried these attempts to smuggle absolutism into the 
common law through the back door of emergency powers—such as Lord Coke 
and Sir Matthew Hale—subsequently became heroes to the founding fathers. 
Likewise, Sir Francis Bacon’s attempt to introduce these principles into the 
maxims of the common law failed, as jurists such as William Noy rooted out 
Bacon’s corruptions from later books of maxims. By the time of the framing, 
influential books of maxims explicitly disavowed the notion that the executive 
can ignore the law in defense of the state, as evidenced by the remarks of the 
anonymous “Gentleman of Middle Temple” in a treatise that found its way into 
the libraries of the Framers. 
Finally, this Article demonstrated that the Framers might have derived a 
strong theory of executive defense of the salus populi from their exposure to 
John Locke’s use of this concept. While Locke held that the executive could 
ignore the technicalities of law to preserve public welfare (since he was not 
specifically bound by such means as the coronation oath to observe all the 
laws), he in fact did make explicit promises to uphold the fundamental laws 
(i.e., the constitution), a commitment which Locke clearly held to be not only 
binding, but unbreakable. There is ample evidence that the Framers read Locke 
correctly as a rejection of Filmer and Hobbes’s views on sovereignty, since 
they embraced Locke and abhorred Hobbes. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
422 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:355 
All of the founding fathers’ intellectual influences pointed them away from 
the theory of executive powers that Paulsen and others believe to be implicit 
within the Constitution of the United States. Accordingly, in addition to 
showing that a strong theory of executive privilege to defend the salus populi 
is not necessary to the preservation of the constitutional order, this history 
demonstrates something else. Namely, it illustrates that there was a strong 
presumption against an executive privilege to ignore the laws, such that the 
Framers—had they decided to depart from two thousand years of 
constitutionalist tradition—would have incorporated it explicitly. In view of 
this history and its influence on the Framers, the argument that the Constitution 
adopted this view implicitly is absurd. 
A constitution without an executive privilege to ignore its limits is not a 
suicide pact: constitutions without this have survived for centuries. Rather, it is 
merely a constitutional order that would require the executive, should he 
ignore the constitution in order to protect the public, to accept responsibility 
and the possibility of punishment for its actions. Should the people conclude 
that this was necessary, although unconstitutional—as with Lincoln’s 
suspension of habeas corpus—there will likely be no repercussions.479 
However, pretending that the executive has an implicit constitutional power to 
ignore the constitution whenever he or she deems necessary gives them the 
power to break the laws with impunity, something that constitutionalist writers 
since Polybius have concluded will pave the way to tyranny. 
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